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This article covers cases from 143 S. W.3d through 170 S. W.3d, which the
authors believed were noteworthy by adding to the jurisprudence on real
property. The authors acknowledge the assistance of the following
attorneys for their initial review and drafting of portions of this article:
Michael P. Aguilar, Jeanne M. Caruselle, Lorin Combs, Adam Darowski,
Rusty A. Fleming, Ryan J. Harris, Benjamin F. S. Herd, Kathryn S.
Kildebeck, Joshua Lebar, Jeffrey W. Matthews, Robert A. McNiel, David
S. Morris, ChristopherT. Nixon, Brooke J. Reid, James R. Schnurr, Tracey
R. Scoggin, Michelle L. Simpkins, Lisa A. Smith, David F. Staas, Douglas
W. Sweet, Raegan R. J. Watchman, Jason T. Whitcomb, and Carrie M.
Winkler.
I.

MORTGAGES, LIENS, AND FORECLOSURES

N Apex FinancialCorp. v. Garza,1 the court determined whether a
grantee under an unrecorded quitclaim deed or a purchaser at a subsequent sheriff's sale had superior interest in a piece of property located in Dallas, Texas. On July 23, 1997, Garza received a quitclaim deed
to the property, which remained unrecorded until April 10, 2000. On November 30, 1999, Verizon obtained a money judgment against the grantor
of Garza's quitclaim deed. Since the quitclaim deed was not recorded,
this grantor appeared as the record owner of the property. Verizon had a
writ of execution issued. A sheriff's sale of the property took place on
April 4, 2000, and Apex was the highest bidder. Apex paid valuable consideration and received a sheriff's deed to the property. Apex then
evicted Garza from the property.
Garza filed a declaratory judgment against Apex to determine the
rights and interests of the parties to the property. Apex also filed a thirdparty action against Verizon, seeking a declaratory judgment that if the
sheriff's sale was set aside, Apex would be reimbursed for the purchase
price and other costs relating to the sheriff's sale. At the non-jury trial,
the court found that Garza had superior rights to the property and that
Apex had no action against Verizon. Apex appealed, arguing that the
evidence was insufficient at trial to support the trial court's judgment.
Apex first claimed that it had superior title to the property since it was
a bona fide purchaser with no notice of Garza's claim of ownership under
the unrecorded quitclaim deed. Generally, an unrecorded conveyance is
void as to a subsequent purchaser for value without notice of the claim of3
ownership. 2 However, notice of a claim may be actual or constructive.
The court stated that "a purchaser has the duty to ascertain the rights of a
third-party possessor where the possession is visible, open, exclusive and
unequivocal. ' 4 Sufficient evidence was presented at the trial court that
1. 155 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

2. Id. at 234.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Garza openly used the property for his trucking business on a daily basis;
such evidence included Garza business signs on the trucks, parking of
business trucks on the property, working on and washing of trucks on the
property, the existence of only a single building used by Garza as an office, and Garza employees on site. The court therefore concluded that
Garza's use of the property was visible, open, and exclusive. 5 On the
issue of whether Garza's use was unequivocal, the court, distinguishing a
Texas Supreme Court case involving occupancy of a multi-family rental
property, 6 found that, since this property was not a multi-unit rental
property and no assurances of ownership were made to Apex, Garza's
use of the property was unequivocal. Thus, there was sufficient evidence
to support the finding
that Apex had constructive notice of Garza's claim
7
to the property.
Next, Apex argued that the sheriff's deed was valid and vested superior
title to the property. Under Texas law, a purchaser at a sheriff's sale only
receives whatever title, interest, or claims the judgment debtor had at the
time of the sale. 8 In this case, since the judgment debtor had already
deeded his interest to Garza before the sale, Apex's sheriff's deed conveyed no interest to the property. The court distinguished cases granting
reimbursement when the sheriff's deed was set aside. In this matter, the
sheriff's deed was not set aside, and it was a valid quitclaim with no warranty of title; therefore, Apex was not entitled to any reimbursement
from Verizon. 9
In Segal v. Emmes Capital, L.L.C.,10 the main issue addressed by the
court was whether a deed of trust that encumbered three pieces of real
estate in three different counties could be foreclosed on at one sale held
in one of the counties. The Fogartys and Segals, as owners of a Texas
limited partnership, executed a promissory note and a deed of trust that
encumbered the three tracts in favor of Emmes. The note matured in
1998, and the borrower defaulted. That spring, the borrower filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. When the borrower failed to follow the terms of
the agreed order of the bankruptcy court, the automatic stay was lifted.
As none of the properties overlapped into adjoining counties, the trustee
of the foreclosure sale posted notices of the sale for each tract in all three
counties. Emmes foreclosed on the three properties at a single non-judicial foreclosure sale conducted in Harris County. Emmes was the highest
bidder for all three properties, but a deficiency remained. Emmes filed
deficiency claims against the Fogartys and Segals, as guarantors. In response to the deficiency claims, the Fogartys and Segals counterclaimed,
arguing that Emmes improperly sold all three parcels of property at a
5. Id. at 235.
6. Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 605 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam).
7. Garza, 155 S.W.3d at 235-36.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 155 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism'd). See discussion
infra Section III on guaranties.
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single foreclosure sale. Specifically, the Fogartys and Segals claimed that
the sale's location chilled the bidding process for the tracts located in
Polk County and Montgomery County. a1
The court conducted an in-depth analysis of Texas Property Code section 51.002(a). The applicable portion of the statute reads: "a sale of real
property under a power of sale conferred by a deed of trust or other
contract lien. .. must take place at the county courthouse in a county in
which the land is located or if the property is located in more than one
county, the sale may be made at the courthouse in any county in which
the property is located."'12 The Fogartys and Segals interpreted this provision to mean that if a deed of trust covers several non-contiguous pieces
of property, each of which lies in only one county, and none of which lies
in the same county, then the trustee must sell each piece of property in
the county where it lies. In that case, the trustee's sale would have violated this section of the Texas Property Code. In contrast, Emmes construed the statute to mean that if a deed of trust covers several noncontiguous pieces of property, each of which lies in only one county and
none of which lies in the same county, the trustee may sell all pieces of
property in any of the counties where any of the properties lie. In that
would have complied with this section of the
case, the foreclosure sale
13
Texas Property Code.
The court first examined the plain language of section 51.002(a), specifically the phrases "real property," "land," and "property." Since the
plain language of this section could support two reasonable interpretations, the court determined that the statute's plain language was ambiguous. 14 The court also determined that none of the Code Construction
Act's 1 5 factors assisted in resolving this section's ambiguity. Since there
were beneficial and detrimental consequences to both parties' interpretations, the court turned to the legislative history to determine which interpretation was correct. There have been two versions of this statute. The
first version, adopted in 1889, stated that sales of real property under a
deed of trust must be conducted in the county where the property is located. However, if the property is located in more than one county, the
sale may occur in any county where the property is located, as long as
notice of the sale is given in each county.1 6 In 1915, the language was
amended to read that if a property was located in more than one county
and notices of the sale were posted in all such counties, "such sale will be
made of such real estate in that one of said counties in which the greater
portion of the real estate may be situated; if equal quantities of said land
to be sold lie in different counties, said notice shall designate in which of
11. Id. at 271.

§ 51.002(a) (Vernon 1995).
13. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 285-86.
14. Id. at 287.
15. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998).
16. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 286-94.
12. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
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said counties the sale is to be made."' 17
The Fogartys and Segals claimed that the language in the two versions
is materially different and that by abandoning the previous version, the
legislature intended to reject Emmes' position that if land is located in
multiple counties, a single sale can take place in one of the counties. The
court disagreed, finding that this former language was equally ambiguous.
The former versions also used the ambiguous phrases "real estate" and
"land," and the ambiguity of such language does not reject Emmes' interpretation of the statute. 18 After this in-depth review of the legislative
history of this section of the Texas Property Code, the ambiguity concerning the proper county of sale was not resolved.
The court next relied on the doctrine of legislative acceptance to resolve the ambiguity. This doctrine states that the legislature intends the
statute to have the meaning ascribed by the courts if an ambiguous statute has been reenacted by the legislature. In Bateman v. Carter-Jones
Drilling Co.,1 9 which supports the Emmes' interpretation of the section

and was the only case on point,20 the court considered the language of a
predecessor statute to section 51.002(a) and upheld the validity of a Rusk
County foreclosure sale of a non-contiguous property located in Gregg
County, which was sold with other Rusk County tracts encumbered by
the deed of trust. The Bateman court stated that
[s]urely the Legislature, when they [sic] made the provision for the
sale of land where the greater portion thereof is situated and if in
equal quantities the notice shall designate in which of said counties
the sale is to be made, did not anticipate that land could be situated
in a half-dozen or more counties and likely to be contiguous, one
tract to the other, making a complete
chain back to the county in
21
which the sale was to be held.
The Segal court held that the Bateman holding was still relevant since
there had been no material changes to this section of the Texas Property
Code since the time of the decision. Based on this precedent, the court
held that the trustee properly conducted the sales of all tracts of land
under the deed of trust in Harris County.
In Associates Home Equity Services Co. v. Hunt,22 the court addressed
whether property owners who exercised their right of redemption after a
tax sale restored their title as it existed before the tax sale. The Hunts
signed a promissory note and deed of trust payable to Associates Home
Equity Services. After the Hunts failed to pay property taxes, the
Tomball Independent School District obtained a judgment against the
17. Act of March 10, 1915, 34th Leg., R.S., ch. 43, § 1, 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 84,
amended by Act of May 28, 1915, 34th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 15, § 2, 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 2, 3233.
18. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 291-92.
19. 290 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
20. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 294.
21. Bateman, 290 S.W.2d at 370.
22. 151 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
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Hunts, and the property was sold at a tax sale to satisfy the school district's tax liens. After a third party purchased the property at the sale, the
Hunts redeemed the property in accordance with section 34.21(c) of the
Texas Tax Code. Associates then posted the property for foreclosure sale
under the deed of trust. The trial court enjoined Associates from foreclosing on the property and Associates appealed. 23
The issue on appeal was whether the foreclosure of the tax lien, since it
was superior to Associates' mortgage lien, extinguished the deed of trust
lien, or if the redemption after the tax-lien foreclosure reinstated the title
to its previous state encumbered by the lien of the deed of trust. Relying
on precedent, the court found that redemption does not give new title.
The court stated that, as a general principle, an owner who does not pay
taxes should not be allowed to strengthen his title at a tax sale. However,
since the Hunts exercised the right of redemption within the time period
permitted by the statute, their prior title to the property was restored.
The court distinguished between the foreclosure of a senior lien extinguishing a junior lien and the effect of redemption of an existing lien.
When the Hunts redeemed the property, they restored title to what it was
before the tax sale-without the tax lien but with the deed of trust lien
remaining valid against the property. Therefore, Associates had the right
to proceed with the foreclosure sale. 2 4
Justice Burgess authored a dissenting opinion, claiming that the majority created an exception to the long-standing rule that a superior lien extinguishes an inferior lien. 25 Justice Burgess noted that in Murphee
Property Holdings, Ltd. v. Sunbelt Savings Association of Texas, redemption was a factor in the court's opinion, although it was not the primary
issue. 26 Under that interpretation, the tax lien foreclosure would extinguish the contractual deed of trust lien.2 7 Without listing the particulars
he envisioned, Justice Burgess suggested that mischief could be created
28
by the majority's ruling.
In Adams v. First National Bank of Bells/Savoy,29 the court addressed
several issues involving due-on-sale clause defaults and wrongful foreclosure. Adams obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to finance her
plans to renovate a building that she owned in Sherman, Texas. A year
later, she obtained a second personal loan from the bank. Subsequently,
to improve the credit-worthiness of Adams' wholly-owned company, she
transferred ownership of the property to the company without the
lienholder's consent. The warranty deed from Adams to the company
was placed in a drawer and never recorded. Subsequently, the bank dis23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562-64.
817 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
Hunt, 155 S.W.3d at 563.
Id.

29. 154 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.). See discussion infra Sec-

tion II on notes.
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covered that the property was listed as an asset on both Adams' personal
financial statement and the company's financial statement. After Adams
confirmed she had transferred the property to the company, the bank
gave notice of default both for conveying the property and for failing to
complete the remodeling. The bank accelerated the debt and demanded
payment without providing Adams notice of acceleration. The property
was then posted for foreclosure. Adams attempted to rescind the deed to
her company and began paying regular monthly payments on the note.
On September 5, 2000, the
The bank rejected these partial payments.
30
bank foreclosed on the property.
The foreclosure deeds recited that "default has occurred in the payment of the Obligations [sic] when due" and that "written notice of default and of the opportunity to cure the default to avoid acceleration of
the maturity of the Note was served on behalf of the Beneficiary by certified mail."'3 1 In addition, the substitute trustee filed affidavits stating that
Adams "had a period of not less than twenty days to cure the default
before the entire debt secured by the Deed of Trust became due and notice of the proposed foreclosure sale was given."'32 After Adams sued the
bank for wrongful foreclosure, the substitute trustee filed corrective foreclosure-sale deeds, stating that the bank had requested the enforcement
of the deeds of trust because a violation of the terms and conditions of
the note and deed of trust had occurred. The trustee also corrected the
affidavit, which included language that Adams had been given notice and
opportunity to cure the default. After the trial court granted the bank's
motion for summary judgment, Adams appealed based on the fact that
foreclosure had occurred under the incorrect recitations in the original
deed and affidavit, which affected the summary-judgment ruling on the
estoppel and waiver issue (although not on her wrongful-foreclosure
claim). 33 However, since Adams did not provide sufficient evidence or
authority on this point, 34
the appellate court concluded that it did not raise
a genuine issue of fact.
Adams also argued that she rescinded the deed transferring title to the
company, and therefore, there was no default at the time of the foreclosure. The court agreed with the bank that such attempted rescission was
too late, especially considering that Adams had waived the right to cure
such a default. 35 The court also rejected Adam's contention that the
bank knew of such transfer, remained silent, and hence, had waived such
breach. Because of Adam's failure to sufficiently brief the issue, the
36
court did not reach the merits of this position.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

154 S.W.3d at 864-65.
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id. at 871.
Id. at 872.
Id.
Id. at 873.
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In National Enterprise,Inc. v. E.N.E. Properties,37 the court addressed
the issue of whether an assignee of a note and deed of trust from the
FDIC could assert a six-year statute of limitations for an action to collect
a deficiency after foreclosure. After the Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC") assigned its interest in a note and deed of trust to National Enterprise, National Enterprise foreclosed on the property. Four-and-a-half
years later, National Enterprise brought a deficiency action against
E.N.E. National Enterprise claimed that, as successor to the RTC, it was
entitled to the RTC's special six-year limitation period, rather than the
standard two-year period. The court looked at prior Texas Supreme
Court authority dealing with FDIC assignee rights, 38 and discovered that
those cases based their decisions on whether the FDIC or the assignee
held the note and deed of trust at the time of accrual of the subject action. The deficiency claim in the National Enterprise case accrued upon
foreclosure, and National Enterprise held the note and deed of trust at
the time of the foreclosure. Thus, the court concluded that National Enterprise was not entitled to the benefit of the RTC's six-year limitation
period.

39

In Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc.,40 the court reviewed the claims of
a purchaser who wanted rescission of an agreement to purchase a note
secured by a deed of trust. Nelson offered to purchase the note and deed
of trust from Regions when Nelson's son defaulted under these agreements. By doing so, Nelson prevented the foreclosure of his son's home.
Even though Nelson delivered payment to the bank, the original note and
deed of trust were never delivered to him. Nelson never foreclosed on
the note and deed of trust. Four years after the note was originally accelerated by Regions, Nelson brought this action. The trial court granted
Region's motions for summary judgment. 4 1
On appeal, Nelson claimed that summary judgment should not have
been granted against his rescission claims because he did not receive the
original note and deed of trust and therefore could not enforce the note
as an owner. The court agreed that Nelson was not a holder of the note
under the law of negotiable instruments. However, the court stated that
"even if a person is not the holder of a note, he may still be able to prove
that he is the owner and entitled to enforce the note, foreclose on collateral and obtain a deficiency judgment under common law principles of
assignment. ' 42 Relying on these principles of assignment and agency, instead of the law of negotiable instruments, the court refused to conclude
that Nelson could not have enforced the note. Furthermore, since Nelson
chose not to enforce the note, the court refused to speculate as to
37. 167 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
38. See Jackson v. Thweatt, 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994) and Holy Cross Church of God
in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001).
39. Nat7 Enter., 167 S.W.3d at 43.
40. 170 S.W.3d 858 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
41. Id. at 860-61.
42. Id. at 864.
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whether any injury occurred to Nelson. 4 3 Without injury, there was no
credible claim for rescission, and the court affirmed the summary judgment against Nelson.
II.

NOTES, LOAN COMMITMENTS,
AND LOAN AGREEMENTS

The issue in First National Acceptance Co. v. Dixon44 was whether the
purchaser of certain payments on a real estate lien note was a holder in
due course entitled to enforce the note. Dixon executed a real estate lien
note payable to the order of Bramble. Bramble and First National Acceptance Co. executed a purchase agreement whereby First National
bought certain monthly installments under the note and the sole power to
enforce the note and foreclose the property upon default. Upon execution of the purchase agreement, Bramble executed an endorsement to the
real estate lien note purporting to convey the entire note to First National. The endorsement read, "Pay without recourse to the order of First
National Acceptance Company." Thereafter, a default occurred under
the note and First National foreclosed on the property. Dixon sued First
National for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the note was unenforceable for lack of consideration. Unbeknownst to First National, the loan
from Bramble to Dixon was a sham because no consideration existed for
the real estate lien note. The trial court set aside the foreclosure sale and
voided the note and lien, holding that the note was unenforceable due to
lack of consideration. Further, the court held that First National was a
mere partial assignee of the note and, thus, was not a holder in due
45
course entitled to enforcement thereof.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that First National is a holder in
due course and not a mere partial assignee of the note. The court determined that the endorsement transferred the entire note to First National;
Bramble only had a contingent future interest in the remaining payments
due. The court rejected Dixon's argument that the purchase agreement
modified the real estate lien-note endorsement. Rather, the court determined that Dixon's only basis for denying First National holder-in-duecourse status was section 3.203(d) of the Texas Business and Commerce
Code, 46 but that such section was inapplicable since the entirety of the
47
note was transferred to First National.
The primary issue presented in Suttles v. Thomas Bearden Co.,48 was
whether the representative of a company was personally liable on a
43. Id. at 864-65.
44. 154 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
45. Id. at 219-20.
46. "If a transferor purports to transfer less than the entire instrument, negotiation of
the instrument does not occur. The transferee obtains no rights under this chapter and has
only the rights of a partial assignee." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.203(d) (Vernon
2002).
47. First Nat'l, 154 S.W.3d at 225.
48. 152 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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promissory note given the manner in which it was signed. Suttles, the
President of TS-Clare, Inc., executed a promissory note for the benefit of
Thomas Bearden Co. ("TBC"). Suttles signed the promissory note twice.
His first signature appeared as follows:
Gessner Partners Ltd.
TS-Clare, Inc., General Partner
Tracy Suttles, President
Is! Tracy Suttles
Borrower
His second signature appeared at the bottom of the promissory note below a handwritten amendment that the parties added concerning the accrual of interest under the note. This signature appeared as follows:
Is! Tracy Suttles
A default occurred under the note, and TBC sued Suttles and TS,
among other parties, requesting partial summary judgment on its claims
49
against Suttles and TS. The trial court granted that request.
On appeal, Suttles and TS contended that Suttles should be shielded
from personal liability on the promissory note under subsection
3.402(b)(1) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code 50 given that Suttles signed the note solely in his representative capacity as president of
TS. TBC argued that Suttles was personally liable on the note because
the note failed to identify a "represented person" as required by Texas
Business and Commerce Code section 3.402(b)(1) in two respects. First,
TS was not "identified" in the promissory note, and second, the promissory note was ambiguous with respect to whether Suttles signed solely in
his representative capacity. The court rejected their first argument, holding that the identification of TS in the signature block of the promissory
note was sufficient identification of the represented person under Texas
Business and Commerce Code section 3.402(b)(1). 51 Suttles signed the
note in his representative capacity and was not personally liable under
the note.
The court also rejected the three ambiguities identified by TBC in support of its argument that the promissory note was ambiguous with respect
to Suttles' capacity. First, the court rejected the argument that the "joint
and several" provisions of the promissory note created ambiguity as to
Suttles' signing capacity since Texas Business and Commerce Code section 3.402(b)(1) requires the court to look only to the "form of signature"
in determining a person's representative capacity. 52 Second, the court rejected TBC's argument that the signature block was ambiguous since it
49. Id. at 610.
50. This provides that a representative is not liable on the instrument he signs "[i]f the
form of the signature shows unambiguously that the signature is made on behalf of the
represented person who is identified in the instrument." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 3.402(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
51. Suttles, 152 S.W.3d at 612. The Court also concluded that identification of the
principal does not have to occur in the body of the note. Id.
52. Id. at 612-13.
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did not include the name of the principal and the preposition "by" before
his signature, explaining that no such preposition is required to show Sutties' capacity to sign for TS. 53 Finally, the court rejected the argument
that Suttles intended to be personally liable under the promissory note
because there was no indication of representative capacity in the handwritten amendment at the bottom of the note. The court concluded that
such signature was intended merely to indicate that the handwritten
amendment was authorized by TS; it was not intended to be an agree54
ment by Suttles to accept personal liability on the promissory note.
Novation of the limitations period for a note was addressed in Doncaster v. Hernaiz.55 Hernaiz brought an action against Doncaster, a bank
representative, to recover the balance of two 1994 loans to a third party,
which Doncaster had initiated on Hernaiz's behalf. Because the loans
were not repaid to Hernaiz, in 1998, Doncaster signed a document entitled "Carta de Compromiso," in which Doncaster promised to pay the
balance of the two 1994 loans to Hernaiz. In 2002, the loans were still not
repaid to Hernaiz, and Hernaiz sued Doncaster on the note and prevailed
56
in district court.
On appeal, Doncaster presented several affirmative defenses, only one
of which required noteworthy discussion by the court. Doncaster argued
that because the loans that form the basis of the lawsuit were issued in
1994, with a limitations date of April 30, 1998, Hernaiz's claim was barred
by the four-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals determined
that the 1998 Carta de Compromiso served as an acknowledgment of the
old debt under section 16.065 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code. 57 The court explained that this acknowledgment created a new
promise to pay an old debt, thereby restarting the four-year limitation
period as the date the underlying debt became due. 58 Since the date of
the acknowledgment was February 12, 1998, the limitation period extended to April 30, 2002. Therefore, the suit was timely filed on
March 13, 2002, before the end of the limitation period.
In FFPMarketing Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust V, 5 9 the court faced
the issues of (i) whether certain promissory notes were negotiable instruments and (ii) whether the amount due on certain promissory notes was
adequately established. FFP Operating Partners, L.P. executed thirtyone promissory notes in favor of Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Company ("FMAC") and two promissory notes in favor of MTGLQ Investors, L.P. Each of the promissory notes was guaranteed by FFP
53. Id. at 613.
54. Id. at 614.
55. 161 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet. h.).
56. Id. at 599-600.
57. "An acknowledgment of the justness of a claim that appears to be barred by limitations is not admissible... to defeat the law of limitations if made after the time that the
claim is due unless the acknowledgment is in writing and signed by the party to be
charged." TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.065 (Vernon 1997).
58. Doncaster, 161 S.W.3d at 605.
59. 169 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
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Marketing Company, Inc. Thereafter, Bay View Franchise Mortgage Acceptance Company became the successor in interest to FMAC with respect to the notes, guaranties, and associated loan documents and, later,
assigned all of its interests in the respective notes and associated documents to Long Lane Master Trust IV (LLMT) and MTGLQ (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "the appellees"). FFP Operating defaulted
under the notes, and FFP Marketing did not answer the demand under
the guaranties; therefore, the appellees filed a combined motion for summary judgment against FFP Operating and FFP Marketing. 60 The trial
court granted the appellees' motion, and FFP Marketing appealed. 61
The first issue that the court of appeals addressed was whether the
thirty-three promissory notes were negotiable instruments. FFP Marketing contended that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
because a question of fact existed as to the ownership of the promissory
notes and guaranties. The appellees replied that the notes and guaranties
were negotiable instruments, that Texas law only requires that they establish that they are holders of the promissory notes and guaranties, and that
they established such status. The court stated that a negotiable instrument "is a written unconditional promise to pay a sum certain in money,
upon demand or at a definite time, and is payable to order or to
bearer."'6 2 The promissory notes defined the maker's liability as including
"obligations" set forth in other loan documents. Therefore, since the extent of the maker's liability could not be determined from the face of the
note, the promissory notes did not satisfy the sum certain requirement of
a negotiable instrument. 6 3 Further, the court stated that the promissory
notes did not contain an unconditional promise because they incorporated by reference the "terms" of other documents, requiring a review of
the other documents to ascertain whether any conditions were placed on
payment of the notes. 64 Given these facts, the court held that the promissory notes were not negotiable instruments.
Because the endorsement of a non-negotiable instrument does not create a presumption of ownership in the transferee, the transferee must
provide proof of legal ownership thereof. 65 The summary-judgment
proof offered by appellees consisted of a loan-servicer's officer affidavit,
with attached copies of the note, guaranties, and related loan and assignment documents. The attached documents purported to establish a chain
of legal ownership of the notes to the appellees; however, the body of the
affidavit stated that the appellees were the "holder and beneficial owner"
of the notes, guaranties, and other documents. 66 This created an internal
60. Before the trial court ruled, FFP Operating filed bankruptcy and was non-suited
from the case.
61. FFPMarketing Co., 169 S.W.3d at 405-06.
62. Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 408.
64.

Id.

65. Id. at 409.
66. Id. at 410.
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inconsistency in the affidavit, and the court concluded that it was insufficient to prove legal ownership of the documents.
Second, the court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the
amount due on the promissory notes was established as a matter of law.
The court explained that, while detailed proof of the promissory note's
balance is not required, summary-judgment evidence must establish the
applicable rate of interest on a note as a matter of law. 67 In this case,
each note provided for interest at the lesser of either the interest rate
specified in the note or at the highest rate allowed by Connecticut law,
and, upon default, the note provided for interest at the lesser of five percent over the note rate or the highest rate allowed by Connecticut law.
Because the highest rate allowed by Connecticut law was not presented in
the summary-judgment evidence, the evidence was insufficient to prove
the applicable rate of interest for each note as a matter of law. Furthermore, because the numerous notes contained varying principal balances
and interest rates, an affidavit setting forth an aggregate total balance due
under all of the notes created ambiguity sufficient to preclude summary
68
judgment.
The scope of a waiver-of-notice provision in a note is addressed in Adams v. First National Bank of Bells/Savoy.69 First National Bank of Bells/
Savoy accelerated the maturity of a real estate lien note executed by Adams and thereafter foreclosed the real estate because of Adams' violation
of the due-on-sale clause set forth in the deed of trust. The real estate
lien note contained a clear waiver of notice of intention to accelerate the
note's maturity and notice of acceleration. Adams brought an action
against First National for wrongful foreclosure, among other claims. The
district court awarded summary judgment in favor of First National, and
Adams appealed.
On appeal, Adams argued, inter alia, that she did not waive the right to
notice of intent to accelerate maturity and the right to an opportunity to
cure the alleged due-on-sale clause violation because the waiver clause
and the due-on-sale clause were not in the same paragraph. The court
concluded that because the waiver clause of the real estate lien note refers to a default "in the performance of any obligation" and that the note
and deed of trust must be construed together, the waiver applies to a
default in the performance of any obligation set forth in the loan documents, including the due-on-sale clause. Thus, the court held that Adams
70
waived such rights.

67. Id. at 411.
68. Id. at 412-13.
69. 154 S.W.3d 859 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.). See discussion supra Section
I on mortgages.
70. Id. at 868.
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GUARANTIES

7
In First Union National Bank v. Richmont Capital Partners I, L.P.,
First Union made a number of loans to Marketing Specialist Corporation
that were secured by a first lien in many of Marketing Specialists' assets.
Marketing Specialist and Chase Manhattan Bank subsequently entered
into a Credit Agreement under which Chase made a $50-million revolving-credit facility to Marketing Specialist. In connection with the Chase
loan, Richmont, a private venture capitalist, guaranteed up to $10 million
72
of the Chase loan.
First Union and Chase then entered into an Intercreditor Agreement,
which set forth the parties' priority of rights in Marketing Specialist's collateral and in repayment of the loans. A few months later, Chase agreed
to increase the amount under the revolving credit facility to $60 million,
consisting of two tranches: Tranche A, which consisted of $41 million, and
Tranche B, which consisted of $19 million. At the same time, MS Acquisition, a subsidiary of Richmont, entered into a Master Participation
Agreement with Chase under which, among other things, MS purchased a
100% participation interest in Tranche B in return for any amounts paid
to Chase on the Tranche B portion of the loan. In connection with these
transactions, Richmont executed a consent, which expanded the terms of
its original guaranty to cover the increased Chase credit facility but kept
its liability limited to $10 million. Finally, Marketing Specialist, Chase,
First Union, MS, and Richmont entered into an Amended Intercreditor
Agreement, under which Chase and First Union agreed that they would
not accept a security interest in any "additional collateral" of Marketing
Specialist unless each lender was granted a perfected security interest in
'73
the "additional collateral.
Ultimately, Marketing Specialist filed for bankruptcy, which prompted
Chase to file suit against Richmont for payment under the guaranty. First
Union intervened, claiming that: (i) it was entitled to a right of payment
under the guaranty by enforcement of its security interest in the "additional collateral," (ii) it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the
guaranty, and (iii) Richmont was unjustly enriched by failing to pay MS
under the guaranty. Richmont and Chase settled out of court, and First
Union appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
74
Richmont.
On appeal, the court dismissed First Union's claim that it had a security
interest in the guaranty based on the Amended Intercreditor Argument.
In examining the Agreement, the court determined that the term "additional collateral" was not defined in any of the transaction documents,
and neither party claimed that the term was ambiguous. 75 Because the

71. 168 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
72. Id. at 922.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 925.
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contract was unambiguous, it had to be construed as a matter of law by its
four corners. 76 In concluding that the guaranty was not additional collateral as contemplated by the Amended Intercreditor Agreement, the
court held that: (i) the dictionary definition of collateral refers to things
like "stocks or bonds" to secure or guarantee an obligation and would not
encompass a guaranty agreement, 77 (ii) the list of property subject to a
security interest under section 9.102(a)(12) of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code does not include guaranties, 78 (iii) the guaranty was security and not collateral, 79 and (iv) the Amended Intercreditor Agreement
related to "additional collateral" that was the property of the borrower,
and the guaranty was not property of Marketing Specialist. 80 The other
points are not noteworthy.
The next two cases involve significant aspects of the Texas anti-deficiency statute for guarantors.
A case of first impression involving the effectiveness of a guarantor's
waiver of valuation rights under the Texas anti-deficiency statute is addressed in Segal v. Emmes Capital,L.L.C 81 Emmes loaned $6.85 million
to a borrower. The loan was secured by three tracts of real property and
by the guaranties of the Fogartys and the Segals. The borrower subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and Emmes sued the guarantors under the
terms of the guaranties. In the interim, the bankruptcy court issued an
order modifying the automatic stay, providing that if the borrower failed
to pay the outstanding balance of the loan to Emmes within a particular
time period, the stay would be lifted and Emmes could foreclose on the
property. When the borrower failed to pay the debt in full, Emmes conducted a non-judicial foreclosure on the property and made the highest
bid at the foreclosure sale. The guarantors counterclaimed, asserting that
the properties were sold for less than fair market value and seeking a
determination of the property's value to offset against a deficiency judgment. The court first addressed the claim that New York's deficiency
law 82 barred recovery. The court denied this claim, finding such law to be
a procedural bar under existing New York authority. The court thus concluded that the waiver of "any defenses" contained in the bankruptcy
83
court order precluded the use of such defensive deficiency-claim bar.
The court then considered whether the guarantors had waived their rights
to a fair market valuation. Emmes claimed that the guarantors had
waived their rights in the guaranty for a fair market valuation as provided
76. Id.
77. Id. at 927.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 927-28 (relying on Preston Ridge Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Tyler, 796 S.W.2d 772
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)).

80. Id. at 928.
81. 155 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. dism'd). See discussion
supra Section I on mortgages.
82. New York law is applicable because the suits on the guaranties were filed in New
York.
83. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 276-77.
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in section 51.005 of the Texas Property Code. The guarantors, on the
other hand, asserted that the waiver of section 51.005 in the guaranty was
invalid because it violated public policy and waived rights that had not yet
come into existence. 84
The guaranties contained a specific written waiver of defenses based on
sections 51.003, 51.004, and 51.005 of the Texas Property Code.85 In addressing the guarantors' claim that waiver was against public policy, the
court discussed the legislative intent of section 51.005(b) of the Texas
Property Code. 86 The court determined that the legislature had intended
for this provision to be waivable for three reasons. First, the guarantor
cited no authority that such a waiver was contrary to a fundamental policy of Texas jurisprudence. 8 7 Secondly, the court pointed to related statutory provisions that prohibited waiver. For instance, in section 51.002 of
the Texas Property Code, the statutory provision dealing with a required
21-day notice to cure a default as a condition to a foreclosure notice, the
statutory language begins with "[n]otwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary, '88 which the court explained indicates that a waiver would not
be legal. Further, the court found evidence in the legislative history that
section 51.002 could not be waived. 89 Neither the language nor the legislative history supported the conclusion that section 51.005 could not be
waived. 90 Finally, the court noted that there were at least eleven other
instances within the Texas Property Code in which the legislature stated
that waivers were void or voidable, but that such statements do not appear with respect to section 51.005.91 Therefore, the court concluded that
such provision was waivable.
The guarantors also contested the ripeness of the waiver. The court
distinguished the cases that the guarantors cited, noting that (i) waivers of
procedural bars are more limited than those of substantive rights, and (ii)
cases of implied waiver, rather than express or contractual waiver, require that the right to be waived must exist contemporaneously with the
waiver, the
waiver. As the subject waiver was an express contractual
92
court granted summary judgment in favor of Emmes.
Mays v. Bank One, N.A. 93 also involved a deficiency judgment after a
non-judicial foreclosure. The borrower executed a note in favor of Bank
One, which was secured by a second lien on real property and a guaranty
84. Id. at 272.
85. Id. at 278. The exact waiver language states: "To the maximum extent permitted
by applicable law, [appellants] hereby waive all rights, remedies, claims and defenses based
upon or related to Sections 51.003, 51.004 and 51.005 of the Texas Property Code, to the
extent the same pertain or may pertain to any enforcement of this Guaranty."
86. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.005 (Vernon 1995).
87. Id.
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (Vernon 1995).
89. HOUSE COMM. ON Bus. & COM., BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. H.B. 1504, 70th Leg., R.S.
(1987).
90. Segal, 155 S.W.3d at 279.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 281-82.
93. 150 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
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executed by Mays. Bank of America held a first lien on the real property.
The borrower defaulted on both the Bank of America loan and the Bank
One loan, and Bank of America sold the property at a non-judicial foreclosure sale at 40% of its fair market value. The proceeds of the foreclosure sale satisfied the Bank of America loan, and Bank One brought suit
against Mays on the guaranty. Mays asserted that he was entitled to a
determination of fair market value of the property in accordance with
section 51.005 of the Texas Property Code. The court determined that
under section 51.005(c), the calculation of a deficiency only applied to
94
debt secured by a lien that was not extinguished at a foreclosure sale.
Since the second lien was extinguished by the foreclosure of the first lien,
Mays was not entitled to an offset based on the fair market value of the
property.
First Commerce Bank v. J. V.3, Inc.95 involved guaranties that were executed several months after a loan was renewed. The guarantors argued
that the guaranty agreements were not supported by consideration and
were thus invalid. According to the court, a promise to guaranty the debt
of another that arises after the indebtedness has been created must be
supported by new consideration. 96 In this case, the guaranties had been
executed more than four months after the loan had been made, there had
been no prior agreements contemplating that the guarantors would guaranty the loan, the debt was amply secured without the guaranties, there
was no evidence to infer that the guarantors even knew of the debt, the
guarantors were not principals in the debtor, and there seemed to be no
97
other compelling reason for requiring the debtors to guaranty the debt.
Since there was no consideration, the guaranty agreement was invalid.
Byrd v. Estate of H.G. Nelms 9 8 involved a co-guarantor who purchased
the guaranteed debt and his partners' guaranty and then sued his former
partners for breach of the guaranty. The holder of the guaranty asserted
that each of the guarantors were jointly and severally liable for the debt,
as was set forth in the guaranty agreement. The remaining guarantor, on
the other hand, argued that it was only liable for its proportionate share
of the debt.99 The court reviewed Texas case law and, failing to find precedent in Texas, examined the case law of other jurisdictions and various
other authorities. Upon such review, the court determined that the
holder's right to sue on the note and guaranty as a purchaser or assignee
of the guaranty was limited to the contributive share of the other coguarantors. 10o

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 900.
165 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. filed).
Id. at 369.
Id.
154 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied).
Id. at 162, 163.
Id. at 165.
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USURY

The proper party to assert usury claims against a transferee of a tax lien
was addressed in Weisfeld v. Texas Land Finance Co. 11.101 Texas Land
Finance Company II paid delinquent property taxes for the year 2000 and
property taxes (that were not delinquent) for the year 2001 on behalf of
the property owner Teleamerica Spanish Network, LLC. In connection
with the payment of those property taxes, the Dallas County Tax Assessor-Collector assigned its tax liens covering the property to Texas
Land, as provided under section 32.06 of the Texas Tax Code.10 2 Thereafter, Teleamerica, as maker, executed a real estate lien note, in the amount
of the total sum paid by Texas Land to the tax assessor. After Teleamerica defaulted under the note, Texas Land filed suit against Teleamerica
103
seeking to recover all amounts due under the note.
In March 2003, the appellants purchased the property at the tax lien
foreclosure sale. Texas Land subsequently added the appellants as defendants to its lawsuit, seeking the repayment of the note. The appellants
responded by alleging usury. Texas Land filed a plea in abatement argu10 4
ing that the purchasers lacked standing to assert a usury defense.
Texas Land argued that the appellants were not "obligors" authorized
to recover penalties under Chapter 349 of the Texas Finance Code. The
appellants countered that they possessed standing to assert Texas Land's
usury claims based on section 32.065(e) of the Texas Tax Code. 10 5 Further, the appellants claimed that the statutory language of section
32.065(c) did not limit remedies to the "obligor." However, the court
concluded that because section 32.065(e) specifically referenced a statute 10 6 that limits a lender's liability to an "obligor," the legislature in07
tended liability under section 32.065(e) to attach only to obligors1
The most important development regarding usury during the Survey
period comes from House Bill 955, enacted by the 79th Texas Legislature
during its regular session.1 0 8 This bill made significant changes to the
Texas Finance Code for both commercial and consumer lending transactions.10 9 The below discussion addresses only those that have a significant relation to commercial real estate transactions.
First, "interest" in section 301.002(4) of the Texas Finance Code has
been revised to exclude from its definition any compensation or other
101. 162 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
102. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 32.06 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
103. Weisfield, 162 S.W.3d at 380.
104. Id.

105. Section 32.065(e) of the Texas Tax Code reads: "If in a contract under this section
a person contracts for, charges, or receives a rate or amount of interest that exceeds the
rate or amount allowed by this section, the amount of the penalty for which the person is
obligated is determined in the manner provided by Chapter 349, Finance Code." See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 32.065(e) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
106. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 349.001(a) and (b) (Vernon Supp. 2005).
107. Weisfeld, 162 S.W.3d at 382.
108. Tex. S.B. 1, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005).
109. See generally TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. tit. 4 (Vernon 2006).
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amounts determined or stated by the Finance Code or other applicable
law not to constitute interest or any amounts that are permitted to be
contracted for, charged, or received in addition to what otherwise constitutes interest in connection with an extension of credit. 110 The existence
of this "loophole" in the general definition of interest allows for the exclusions of certain matters discussed later.
The most significant change is the absolute increase of the interest rate
cap on business, commercial, investment, or similar purpose loans to a
minimum ceiling of 28% per year.1 1 ' Another significant aspect of the
usury-law revisions is the change in the penalty for usury on commercial
loan transactions. New section 3.05.001(a-1) of the Finance Code changes
the penalty in a commercial transaction for contracting or receiving' 12 a
usurious rate of interest to an amount equal to three times the amount by
which the total amount of interest contracted for or received exceeds the
3
amount of interest allowed by applicable law."
In addition to the penalty revisions, additional safeguards and protections are afforded to a creditor charging usurious interest. First, the statutory scheme was expanded to include a creditor that not only charged or
14
contracted for usurious interest, but has received usurious interest."
Second, before an obligor can file suit seeking penalties for a usurious
transaction, notice of the usury violation must be given to the creditor at
least sixty-one days before filing the suit for usury." 15 Additionally, a new
provision requires a debtor filing a counterclaim alleging usury to give
notice of the alleged usury violation to the creditor; the pending action is
then abated for sixty days, during which the creditor may correct the
usury violation, including the payment of reasonable attorney's fees of
the debtor in connection with the alleged violation. Upon the correction
of such usury violation, the creditor is no longer liable for such usury
116
violation.
House Bill 955 provided further lender usury protections by specifically
providing that interest does not include prepayment premiums, make
hold premiums, or similar fees or charges on a loan that are payable in
the event of a voluntary prepayment, involuntary prepayment, acceleration of maturity, or other cause that involves premature termination of
117
the loan.
The 79th Legislature also provided a specific provision concerning the
rule in Alamo Lumber," 8 which will come as a relief to many practition110. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(4) (Vernon 2006).
111. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 303.009(c) (Vernon 2006). Note that the 24% ceiling on
loans of less than $250,000 was eliminated.
112. The new statutory language does not include the concept of "charging." See TEX.
FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a-1) (Vernon 2006).

113. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.001(a-1) (Vernon 2006).
114.

TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(b) (Vernon 2006).

115. Id.
116. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 305.006(d) (Vernon 2006).
117. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 306.005 (Vernon 2006).

118. Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold, 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
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ers who have had to grapple with the application of such rule in practice.
A new section 306.007 to the Texas Finance Code provides that, with respect to a commercial loan, an obligor may be required by the creditor to
assume, pay, or provide a guarantee of a third person's existing or future
obligations as a condition to such obligor's own use, forbearance, or detention of money without some constituting interest with respect to such
obligor's loan.1 19
There were a number of provisions in House Bill 955 that would have
exempted commercial loan transactions from any usury considerations;
however, these provisions were expressly contingent upon an effective
constitutional amendment authorizing the same. 120 However, such constitutional amendment was not passed during the November 8, 2005 constitutional-amendment election; hence, such provisions did not become
effective.
V.

DEBTOR/CREDITOR

In Hawthorne v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,1 21 Hawthorne refinanced his mortgage loan through Mission Mortgage of Texas, Inc., which
was identified as the lender on the various loan documents. This included
the mortgagor's affidavit, which granted the lender authority to furnish
information contained in the insurance policy to anyone that the lender
deemed advisable for quoting rates and complying with the deed of trust.
Although Countrywide Home Loans was not mentioned in any of the
closing documents, Mission transferred the servicing rights for the loan to
Countrywide at the time of closing, and Hawthorne signed a notice in
which Hawthorne recognized that Countrywide would be the new servicer of the loan. After Countrywide sent homeowner-insurance solicitation letters to Hawthorne's wife, Hawthorne filed suit against
Countrywide, alleging violations of provisions of the Texas Insurance
122
Code restricting solicitation of business.
The court determined that, as Mission was identified as the lender in
the note and deed of trust, and Countrywide was identified as the servicer
in the notice signed at closing, the intention of the parties with respect to
the identity of the lender was ambiguous, and the court could therefore
turn to additional evidence. The court noted that the affidavit signed by
Hawthorne granted permission to "the Lender" to share insurance information and that Hawthorne knew at the time of closing that Countrywide
had bought the loan and was the lender.1 23 In light of this and additional
information, the court determined that Countrywide was included as a
lender for purposes of the affidavit, and Hawthorne therefore furnished
specific written authority, as required under article 21.48A of the Texas
119. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 306.007 (Vernon 2006).
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Tex. H.B. 955, 79th Leg., R.S., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3438, § 8.02.
150 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.48A, § 2(c) (West Supp. 2004).
Hawthorne, 150 S.W.3d at 576.
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Insurance Code, for Countrywide to share Hawthorne's insurance
information.
Jurisdictional issues involving a lender were discussed in Bryant v.
Roblee.124 Bryant, a Texas resident, brought suit against various parties
for mishandling investments. First Republic Bank, a defendant, filed a
special appearance, asserting that it was not amenable to process issued
by Texas courts. The court analyzed the requirements for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant based on the defendant's "continuous and systematic" contacts with such state. The court stated that125
it
was the quality and nature of contacts with Texas that would control.
The court thus addressed the number and types of contacts: offices or
branches in Texas (First Republic had none), employees in Texas (First
Republic had none), agent for service of process (First Republic had no
such agent), loans to Texas residents (First Republic had made thirtyseven loans in Texas during the last five years compared to 12,000 loans
overall), solicitation of business in Texas (First Republic did not solicit
business in Texas), the principal amount of all Texas loans (First Republic
had $17,218,178 in loan principal on Texas loans), deed of trust liens on
Texas property (First Republic had eleven), and direct advertising in
Texas (First Republic only advertised in Texas in national publications
and with website access from Texas). 126 The court also determined as
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over a nonresident the following matters: ownership of Texas property, contracting with a Texas resident, correspondence with a Texas resident, ownership of loans secured
by Texas property, and the exercise of foreclosure or other remedies to
protect its rights. 127 The court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to show continuous and systematic contacts between First Republic Bank and Texas so as to permit Texas courts to exercise general
jurisdiction over the bank.
VI.

PURCHASER/SELLER

In Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich128 the Texas Supreme Court, in a case of first
impression, ruled that nonpayment of nominal consideration recited in an
option contract does not preclude enforcement of a written option agreement. In rendering this decision, the court adopted section 87(1)(a) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts into the common law of Texas
("'An offer is binding as an option contract' if the offer 'is in writing and
signed by the offeror, recites a purported consideration for the making of
the offer, and proposes an exchange on fair terms within a reasonable

time'

").129

124. 153 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
125. Id. at 631.
126. Id. at 630.
127. Id. at 630-31.
128. 154 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2004).
129. Id. at 106 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (1981)).
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In 1997, Joppich purchased an undeveloped tract of land from a developer. In connection with the transaction, Joppich and the developer executed an "Option Agreement," which stipulated that if Joppich did not
commence construction of a private residence on the undeveloped tract
to
within 18 months after the closing, the developer had the right 130
price.
sale
original
the
of
90%
paying
by
back
purchase the property
The Option Agreement had a term of 5 years from the date of recording
and a consideration of "the sum of Ten and No/100 ($10.00) Dollars ('Option Fee') paid in cash." 1 31 Two years passed, and construction of a residence at the property had not commenced. In September 1999, the
developer sent Joppich a notice, indicating that he was exercising his option to buy back the property in accordance with the terms of the Option
Agreement. Joppich filed suit against the developer, claiming that the
Option Agreement was unenforceable for lack of consideration, or failure of consideration, because the $10.00 was never paid. The trial court
ruled that the Option Agreement was enforceable, though the stated conwas not paid. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's
sideration
1 32
ruling.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. In rendering its decision, the supreme court noted that, while reciting nominal consideration in an option agreement performs a formal function, the
ceremonial delivery of the recited nominal consideration is an "inconsequential formality."'1 33 The court also noted that when parties enter into
option contracts, even though supported by unpaid nominal consideration, the parties expect the contract to be a binding commitment. 134 In
adopting this view on unpaid nominal consideration, the Texas Supreme
Court adopted the minority position of state supreme courts that have
1 35
addressed the issue.
In Brown v. De La Cruz, 36 the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a statutory fine imposed by the Texas Property Code against a
vendor under a contract for deed could be claimed by the purchaser if the
vendor failed to record a deed of conveyance for certain residential property within 30 days after final payment. From 1995 through 2001, the
Texas Property Code stipulated that a seller's failure to meet the record137
ing deadline would subject the seller to a penalty of up to $500 a day.
In 2001, the Texas Property Code was amended to clarify that the $500-aday penalty is payable to the purchaser as liquidated damages. The court
noted that, while the 2001 amendment created a private cause of action
130. Id. at 103.
131. Id.
132. Id.

133.
(1981)).
134.
135.
136.
137.
2001)).

Id. at 108-09 (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Id. at 100.
Id.
156 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2004).
Id. at 561 (referring to TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN.

OF CONTRACTS

§ 87(1) cmt. c

§ 5.079(a) (Vernon 2004) (amended
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for purchasers, there was still an unsettled question as to whether the
such a private cause of action before the 2001
statute created
38
amendment. 1
In Brown, a purchaser agreed to buy property from a seller in 1984.
Final payment for the property was made in 1997 (before the 2001
amendment). Due to confusion as to who would be listed on the deed
(the purchaser had remarried in the intervening years), the deed was not
recorded within 30 days of the final payment as the statute required.
Four years passed, and the deed was still not recorded. 139 In 2001, the
purchaser, alleging no actual damages, brought suit against the seller
seeking $664,500 in damages (the daily statutory penalty over a four-year
period). The seller contended that the Texas Property Code did not grant
the purchaser a private cause
of action, and the trial court agreed. The
140
court of appeals reversed.
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, and ruled against
the purchaser. 141 In rendering its judgment, the Texas Supreme Court
noted that while the statute did contain a specific monetary penalty,
before 2001, the statute was silent with regard to who could collect it. In
so holding, the Texas Supreme Court followed prior precedents, which
held that those who seek to collect a statutory penalty must be specifically authorized by the statute to do so. 142 The court also noted that "virtually all other statutes which imposed a daily penalty in 1995, when
section 5.102 was enacted, only authorized collection by the Attorney
' 143
General or some other governmental entity or representation."
Lewis v. Foxworth14 4 concerned a dispute over which party was entitled
to contractual earnest money when a purchase transaction failed to close.
In 2002, the purchaser and seller entered into a contract for the conveyance of 450 acres of land. The purchaser deposited $50,000 of earnest
money with a title company, which the seller would be entitled to claim if
the transaction failed to close due to a default by the purchaser. The
purchase contract contained a provision indicating that the seller could
remove items of personal property from the property, but the fixtures
would remain intact. The seller removed some of its personal property,
but other items remained. 145 The scheduled closing date passed. After
an extension period lapsed, the seller notified the purchaser that the contract was terminated and that the seller would be claiming the earnest
money as its sole remedy. The title company would not deliver the earnest money to the seller though, and the seller filed suit. 146 The trial
138. Id. at 562 (referring to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.079(b) (Vernon 2004)
(amended 2001)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 564.
143. Id.
144. 170 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
145. Id. at 901.
146. Id. at 902.
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court ruled in favor of the seller, and the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling.
On appeal, the purchaser argued that since the seller did not remove
some items of personal property, the purchaser was excused from performing under the contract. 14 7 The court of appeals noted, however, that
the contract did not specifically require the seller to remove all items of
personal property. Therefore, in removing the items it wanted to keep,
the seller had performed its obligations under that provision and was en148
titled to keep the earnest money.
Aguiar v. Segal149 involved the issue of whether a purchaser could
compel specific performance under a purchase contract. A purchaser and
seller entered into five separate earnest-money contracts for the sale of
five multi-family residential properties. The conveyances were scheduled
to close on July 15, 2003.150 Due to delay in the lender's receipt of appraisal results, the purchaser was granted a 15-day extension of the scheduled closing dates under a financing provision in the contract. The
appraisal results were, however, still not ready 15-days later on July 30.151
The seller orally agreed with the purchaser's broker to extend the closing
deadline for one week. When the August 6 deadline passed, the lender
was still not ready to finance the acquisition, and the seller terminated the
contracts. The appraisal results were received on August 25, and the purchaser filed suit against the seller to compel specific performance. Under
the terms of the contracts, the purchaser could enforce specific performance if the seller defaulted under the contracts. 152 Surprisingly, the trial
court ruled in favor of the purchaser and ordered the seller to convey the
properties to the purchaser. The trial court found that by granting the
one-week oral extension, the seller had created a course of dealing
whereby the seller would be flexible in waiting for the purchaser to obtain the financing. The court of appeals sternly overruled the trial court's
decision, noting that support for the trial court's findings was "so weak
that the findings are clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.1 153 The court
of appeals held that, since the contracts contained a "time is of the essence" clause and the seller only verbally agreed to a one-week extension, the seller was entitled to terminate the contracts on August 6 and to
claim the earnest money in accordance with the terms of the contracts. 154
In Bookout v. Bookout,155 the court of appeals upheld the validity of
an unexecuted purchase contract. In 1994, two brothers created, but did
not execute, a document entitled "Contract for Deed" that detailed the
147. Id.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 903-04.
167 S.W.3d. 443 (Tex. App.--Houston 2005, pet. denied).
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 446.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 445, 456.
165 S.W.3d 904, 912 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
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terms by which one brother (Cris) could purchase the real and personal
property owned by the other brother (Dan). This property was the chiropractic clinic where they both worked. Though the contract was not
signed, Cris began performing under the terms of the contract for seven
years (making $3,000 monthly payments to Dan and his wife). In 2001,
the brothers had a falling-out, and Cris was fired as an employee at the
clinic. At trial, a jury found156that a valid contract existed, even though the
contract was never signed.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling. 157 It noted that a
valid contract for the purchase or sale of real property, to satisfy the statute of frauds, must be in writing and signed by the parties bound thereby,
unless an exception to the statute of frauds exists. 158 Partial performance
of the terms of the contract is a recognized exception to the statute of
frauds. Actions relied on to prove partial performance must be actions
that could have been done with no other intent than to fulfill the terms of
the contract. The court of appeals noted that the monthly payments over
a seven-year period (and acceptance of the payments by Dan) in accordance with the terms of the contract were enough to create an exception
to the statute of frauds and enough to create a valid (though unexecuted)
contract. 59
VII. LEASES; LANDLORD/TENANT
There were several notable cases relating to landlord-tenant disputes
decided during the Survey period. Specifically, Texas courts decided issues concerning premises liability, the implied warranty of suitability, unconscionability, and a government units' liability when acting as landlord.
The Texas Supreme Court, in Western Investments, Inc. v. Urena,160 reviewed the elements for establishing premises liability for landlords. A
ten-year-old boy was sexually assaulted by another tenant in an apartment complex in Houston. The mother sued the landlord for, among
other claims, negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted
summary judgment in the landlord's favor. The court of appeals reversed
and remanded the negligence and premises-liability claims. Citing to a
series of violent crimes over a two-year period at the apartment complex,
the appellate court found that an issue of fact remained as to whether the
sexual assault was foreseeable and thus whether the landlord had a legal
duty to provide its tenants protection from third-party crimes. 16 ' The appellate court also held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence
to demonstrate that the landlord had breached its duty to the boy. 162 In
156. Id. at 906.
157. Id. at 907.
158. Id. at 907-08 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 2002)).
159. Id. at 911.
160. 162 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2005).
161. Id. at 549 (citing Urena v. W. Invs., Inc., 122 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. granted)).
162. Id. (citing Urena, 122 S.W.3d at 256).
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particular, the appellate court pointed to the following facts: 1) the landlord had not replaced its security company at the time of the attack; 2)
the apartment manager testified that she did not review police reports of
criminal activity in the area, as recommended in the Texas Apartment
Association handbook; and 3) a number of tenant identification files,
which typically included copies of drivers licenses and social security
1 63
cards, were incomplete. The landlord appealed.
While the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that the two claims involved distinct duty analyses, it concluded that both causes of action depended on demonstrating that the landlord's act or failure to act was the
proximate cause of the harm.' 64 The court, therefore, chose to analyze
16 5
both the negligence and the premises-liability claims together.
The Texas Supreme Court found that, even if the landlord had a duty
to provide security guards, obtain the police reports on calls relating to
criminal activity in the area, and to investigate its tenants, the plaintiff
had failed to show how breaching those duties caused the sexual attack
on the young boy. 166 The court pointed to the two elements of proximate
cause: cause in fact and foreseeability. 167 The court found that, even if
the landlord had provided security for the premises, that would not necessarily have prevented the crime: the assailant was a resident of the
apartment complex, and the security would not have prevented him from
16 8
moving about the complex or interacting with the other residents.
Similarly, even if the manager had reviewed the police reports, there was
nothing in the reports that would have alerted the landlord that the assailant was a pedophile. 169 Finally, the court found that landlord's incomplete tenant files did not cause the crime at issue. The record was
complete with respect to the tenant that attacked the boy. Furthermore,
the attacker's record contained only a driving infraction, and thus disclosed nothing that would have indicated that the attacker was likely to
170
commit such a violent crime.
Gym-N-I Playgrounds,Inc. v. Snider17 1 involved an analysis of an "asis" clause and the implied warranty of suitability. Ron Snider owned the
Gym-N-I business, including a manufacturing company and the building
in which the company was located. Patrick Finn and Bonnie Caddell had
worked in the building at Gym-N-I for several years. Both Finn and Caddell knew that the building size was slightly over the square-footage
163. Id. at 549-50.
164. Id. at 550. The court described premises liability as "a special form of negligence
where the duty owed to the plaintiff depends upon the status of the plaintiff at the time the
incident occurred." Id. (citing M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. 2004);
Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295-96 (Tex. 1983)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 551.
167. Id.
168. ld.
169. Id. at 551-52.
170. Id. at 552.
171. 158 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed).
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threshold for requiring a sprinkler system. They were also aware that the
fire marshal had recommended that Snider install a sprinkler system and
that Snider had neglected to do so. In 1993, Finn and Caddell bought the
Gym-N-I business from Snider, entering into a commercial lease of the
building with Snider. 172 The lease contained both an "as-is" clause and a
renewal option. The term of the lease expired in 1996, but Gym-N-I continued to pay, and Snider continued to accept, rent payments for the next
four years. The only provision in the lease covering a continuation beyond the initial term was the holdover clause. In 2000, "a fire completely
destroyed the building and its contents.' 73 Gym-N-I sued Snider, claiming, in addition to other claims, breach of the implied warranty of suitability. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
Snider, which was then merged into a final judgment. The court of ap174
peals affirmed the lower court's decision.
Gym-N-I argued two issues on appeal. First Gym-N-I argued that the
"as-is" clause did not apply during the holdover period. The court of
appeals disagreed, referring to the language in the holdover clause stating
that "[a]ny holding over.., shall constitute a lease from month-to-month,
under the terms and conditions of this lease."'1 75 The court found that the
plain meaning of this language was to incorporate all of the original
lease's terms and conditions to govern the holdover period, excepting the
176
terms relating to the lease's duration.
Gym-N-I, in the alternative, asserted that the "as-is" clause was unenforceable. The appellate court referred to Prudential Insurance Co. of
America v. Jefferson Associates, Ltd. 17 7 as the authority for the five-factor
test of enforceability of "as-is" clauses: 1) the parties' sophistication; 2)
terms of the "as-is" agreement; 3) whether the "as-is" agreement was
freely negotiated; 4) whether the agreement was an arms-length transaction; and 5) whether there was a misrepresentation or concealing of a
known fact. 178 Gym-N-I first argued that Prudentialshould only apply to
sales of commercial property, not leases. 179 The appellate court found,
however, that as there is "no meaningful distinction between sales contracts and leases for purposes of determining enforceability;" the same
test for enforceability could apply in the lease context as well.' 8 0 In applying the Prudential test, the appellate court found that Finn and Caddell were familiar with the business, knew about the fire marshal's
172. Id.

173.
174.
175.
176.
2000)).

Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. (referring to Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex.

177. Id. at 85 (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d
156, 161 (Tex. 1995)).
178. Id. (citing Procter III v. RMC Capital Corp., 47 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. App.Beaumont 2001, no pet.)). The Gym-N-I court described the Procter case as "distilling
Prudentialinto [a] five-factor test." Id.
179. Id. at 85.
180. Id.
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recommendation to install a sprinkler system, knew that Snider had not
installed the system, and understood the "as-is" clause. Further, Finn and
Caddell admitted that there was no fraud or misrepresentation involved
in the lease negotiation. 181 The appellate court also found that the trial
court properly granted summary judgment against Finn and Caddell with
respect to their negligence, breach of warranty, and fraud claims because
the valid "as-is" clause negated the causation element of all claims associ1 82
ated with the physical condition of the property.
In its second claim, Gym-N-I argued that the trial court wrongly found
that Gym-N-I waived its implied warranty of suitability, because "only an
express agreement that the tenant will repair certain defects can waive
that warranty. ' 183 The appellate court disagreed, however, with Gym-NI's reading of precedent, stating that, while the Texas Supreme Court did
state that a tenant may waive the warranty by agreeing to repair certain
defects, the Texas Supreme Court did not indicate that such was the only
means by which to waive the warranty. 8 4 Rather, the waiver test was
actually a multi-factor analysis, which was dependent on the particulars of
each case. 185 The court of appeals found that the "as-is" clause effectively waived the implied warranty of suitability, as it specifically mentioned that Snider made no warranties, including the implied warranty of
1 86
suitability.
Ski River Development, Inc. v. McCalla187 involved the enforceability

of an option to purchase in a lease and the effect of claims of unconscionability with respect thereto. Arthur William Glazier originally owned
the 380 acres of land. He entered into a 99-year lease with Walter and
Mary Baker in 1992. In that same lease, the Bakers subleased part of the
property to the McCallas. The sublease contained an option to purchase,
whereby the McCallas had the right to purchase the property at market
value if the Bakers ever gained ownership rights thereto and elected to
sell. A year later, Glazier died and the Bakers gained ownership rights.
In June of 1994, Mary Baker signed a listing agreement with Glenna
Calahan to sell the entire property at a price of $2500 per acre. The McCallas took months to evaluate the market value of the property before
notifying Calahan in October of 1994 that, while they were still interested
in the property, they recommended that the Bakers try to sell the property to someone else at the Bakers' $2500-per-acre asking price. The McCallas did reserve the right, however, to review any contract that the
Bakers received. The Bakers then began conferring with the Davises,
who were interested in buying the property. On February 12, 1996, the
181. Id. at 86.
182. Id. (finding that "Gym-N-I's agreement to accept the premises 'as-is' effectively
supersedes any fault of Snider's").
183. Id.
184. Id. at 87 (citing Davidow v. Inwood N. Prof'1 Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 377
(Tex. 1988)).
185. Id. at 87-88 (citing Davidow, 747 S.W.2d at 377).
186. Id. at 88.
187. 167 S.W.3d 121 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. denied).
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Davises entered into a 99-year lease with the Bakers. In March 1996, the
Davises and the Bakers signed a first amendment to their lease, which
assigned the lease from the Davises to Ski River. A month later, in April
of 1996, the McCallas made an offer to purchase the entire property at
$1200 per acre, threatening to file suit. Mary Baker died a few days after
that. In August of 1996, the Davises and Walter Baker signed a second
amendment to the lease, whereby Walter Baker agreed to receive prior
approval from the Davises before selling any of the property's mineral
rights. The second amendment also granted to the Davises a right of first
refusal if Walter Baker ever tried to sell the property. The McCallas filed
suit against Walter Baker, the Davises, and Ski River in September 1996.
The trial court entered a declaratory judgment that the McCallas had
properly exercised their option to purchase and that the 99-year lease, as
amended, between the Davises and the Bakers was void and unenforceable. 1 88 The court of appeals held that the option to purchase was void
for indefiniteness, reversing the trial court. In addition, the appellate
court upheld the trial court's decision to enter a declaratory judgment
that the Davis-Baker lease was unconscionable and thus unenforceable,
but overruled the trial court's finding that the lease was also void as a
result of such unconscionability.1 89
The Davises and Ski River raised several issues on appeal. Their first
issue, relating to landlord-tenant law, concerned whether or not the McCallas' first option to purchase was void and unenforceable and/or
waived. 190 Specifically, Ski River argued that the clause was void for indefiniteness and, in the alternative, that the McCallas never exercised the
provision or waived their rights. 19 1 The appellate court agreed, citing the
Texas rule that "[w]here the parties intended to make an agreement and
there is a certain basis for granting a remedy, courts should find the contract terms definite enough to provide a remedy.' 192 Although the appellate court found that the clause clearly required that the Bakers acquire
legal ownership before the McCallas could exercise this option, the appellate court also found that the clause left all other terms open to future
negotiation. 193 The appellate court found that the clause suffered from a
lack of definition for "Property" and additional ambiguities such as (i)
whether signing a listing agreement constituted an "election to sell," (ii)
whether an offer from a third party was required before the McCallas
could exercise their right to purchase, (iii) how the property's market
value was to be determined, and (iv) how long the McCallas had to exercise its option. 194 The appellate court found that such a provision, which
left material terms to be agreed upon later, was not definite or specific
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 129-31.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT
Id at 134.
Id.

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 33(2) (1981)).
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enough to be enforceable. 195
The court of appeals then addressed whether the Davis-Baker lease
was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The appellate court
stated that the analysis for determining unconscionability is two-fold,
namely 1) procedural unconscionability and 2) substantive unconscionability. 196 For both types of analyses, a court must examine the totality of
the circumstances, assessing whether the parties had any available alternatives, the parties' respective bargaining power, whether the contract
was illegal, and whether it was oppressive or unreasonable. 197 In order to
find either substantive or procedural unconscionability, the court must
conclude that the grounds for abuse are sufficiently shocking or gross to
compel a court to intercede. 198 The court relied on over 19 pieces of
evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability in the formation of the Davis-Baker lease, including the facts that: the Davises
were aware of the Bakers' desperate need for money at the time of execution; the Bakers did not see the final draft of the lease until the day
they signed; Walter Baker's testimony that he and his wife Mary felt as
though they could not change any lease terms before signing; the Bakers
did not have a lawyer review the lease; the Bakers did not understand the
legal language, such as "severability" and "possessory rights;" and the
Davises never provided a copy of their business plan for the property to
the Bakers, which would have shown improvements that would have increased the property taxes that the Bakers were responsible for under the
lease.' 99
The appellate court similarly found ample evidence to support a finding of substantive unconscionability. The appellate court pointed to several lease terms, including: the Bakers were required to pay all real estate
taxes for the 99-year term; the Davises paid $3000 in monthly rent for the
first 12-1/2 years, after which they would only pay $75 per month, which
was less than the estimated taxes per month; all current sublease income
would be assigned to the Davises; the lease took away all of the Davises'
possessory rights, except the right to maintain a small store on the property; and the lease's release clause prevented the Bakers from selling the
land while the lease was in effect. 2°0 The appellate court found that the
evidence of procedural and substantive unconscionability in the lease also
supported a determination that the first and second amendments were
20 1
unconscionable.
Brenham Housing Authority v. Davies20 2 concerned the liability of a
housing authority, in its capacity as landlord under a lease, for premises
195. Id.
196. Id. at 136.
197. Id.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138-39.
Id. at 139.
158 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
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defects. Margaret Davies first became a tenant of Northside Terrace
Apartments in 1997. Northside Apartments was owned by Northside
Terrace, Ltd. and managed by the Housing Authority of the City of Brenham, Texas a/k/a Brenham Housing Authority ("BHA"). During her tenancy, Davies became mentally and physically ill. She later discovered
that her hot-water heater was emitting carbon monoxide fumes into her
apartment, thus causing her ailments. She was diagnosed with Chronic
Carbon Monoxide Poisoning shortly after replacing the hot-water heater.
She filed suit against BHA and other defendants, alleging, among other
claims, negligence under a premises-defects theory. BHA filed a plea to
the jurisdiction, asserting that it had not waived the immunity-frompremises-defects claims for governmental units, as provided under the
Texas Tort Claims Act ("TTCA"). The trial court entered an order deny20 3
ing the pleas to jurisdiction, and BHA filed an interlocutory appeal.
The court of appeals held that Ms. Davies' pleadings failed to establish
that BHA's immunity had been waived and therefore reversed the trial
court's order, granting the plea to the jurisdiction. The court of appeals
stated that, unless such immunity had been waived, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction and was without authority to hear the case. 2° 4 The provision
of the TTCA that BHA relied on to establish its immunity stated that a
governmental unit's duty of care is limited to the duty that a private person owes to a licensee, unless the claimant "pays for use of the premises." 20° 5 BHA first claimed that Davies had not met the burden of
pleading for a licensee-that Davies had failed to plead that BHA had
actual knowledge of the purported defect.20 6 BHA also argued that Davies did not fall into the exception to local government immunity under
section 101.022(a) of the TTCA, for claimants that "pay for the use of the
premises," because Davies had paid for exclusive and permanent occupancy of the apartment while section 101.022(a) only contemplated payment for temporary use of a facility. 20 7 While the appellate court agreed
that Ms. Davies had not alleged, as required, that BHA had actual knowledge of the defect, 20 8 it disagreed that the plain language of the T-FCA
could be read to limit the exception to payment for temporary use. Therefore, the court found that section 101.022(a) did not limit BHA's liability
20 9
to the licensee standard of care.
Ms.
under
under
son v.

Davies argued that she should be accorded the status of an invitee
the TTCA because she paid rent to BHA and that BHA was thus
the duty of care owed to an invitee. Ms. Davies relied on ThompCity of CorsicanaHousing Authority,210 which held that, because a

203. Id. at 56.
204. Id. at 57.
205. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(a) (Vernon 1997)).

206. Id.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 57-56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. (citing 57 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no pet.)).
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plaintiff had paid the housing authority monthly rent for occupancy of the
apartment, she was entitled to the status of an invitee. The appellate
court distinguished this case from the Thompson case on the grounds that
Thompson relied on cases in which the plaintiff had paid a fee for entry
onto the premises. 211 Ms. Davies' right of possession, however, was not
based on permission or an invitation; rather, her rights derived from a
lease that gave her the legal status of a tenant.2 12 The appellate court
therefore found that Thompson did not apply in the instant case.2 13 Furthermore, the appellate court found that the duty of a landlord to a tenant for dangerous conditions inside the leased premises is narrower than
the duty that a landlord owes to an invitee. 2 14 The court stated that interpreting section 101.022(a) to mean that a housing authority owes the invitee duty of care to every tenant would place a greater duty of care on
public landlords than on private ones. 21 5 Given that section 101.022(a)
generally limits the state's liability for premises defects, the appellate
court found that such an interpretation would be counter to2 16legislative
intent and impose a new duty upon the governmental entity.

After reviewing each parties' analysis, the appellate court then stated
that the invitee-licensee discussion was the improper framework for the
facts at hand. Rather, if BHA owed a duty to Ms. Davies, it would arise
from Ms. Davies' status as a tenant at the complex. The court acknowledged that BHA, as manager, was the lessor's agent. 2 17 Under Texas law,
lessors retain liability over leased premises for the tenant's harm caused
by defects if the landlord retains control over the premises. 218 Ms. Davies
argued that BHA retained control over her leased premises due to a
clause in the management agreement between BHA and Northside Terrace, Ltd., which gave BHA the responsibility for maintenance and repairs for the premises. 21 9 The appellate court disagreed, finding that a
lessor's contractual right to enter the premises for repairs and maintenance was not a reservation of control over the premises. 220 Ms. Davies
was alleging that the management agreement, not the lease between
BHA and Davies, imposed liability on BHA for premises defects. However, even if she had alleged liability based on the lease, that allegation
would have failed because section 392.006 of the Texas Local Government Code makes specific exception to the state's liability as a landlord
211. Id. at 58-59.

212. Id. at 59.
213. Id.
214. Id.

215. Id.
216. Id. (referring to Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch v. Davidson, 882 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ)).

217. Id. at 59.
218. Id. (citing Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. 1978); Brown v.
Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. 1963)).
219. 158 S.W.3d at 60.
220. Id. (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Khan, 138 S.W.3d 288, 295-97 (Tex. 2004); De Leon v.
Creely, 972 S.W.2d 808, 812-13 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.)).
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for any claims for personal injuries as set forth in a lease. 221
VIII.
A.

TITLE MATTERS

ADVERSE POSSESSION

Lightle,22 2

In Nichols v.
the plaintiff brought suit to quiet title to the
420 acres that she purchased at a foreclosure sale. The Amarillo Court of
Appeals held that a statement in the plaintiff's second amended petition
disclaiming interest in any tracts of land owned by the defendant did not
amount to an admission by the plaintiff that the 100-acre tract claimed by
the defendant was not part of the 420 acres owned by the plaintiff. The
court of appeals also held that the plaintiff did not have to present evidence showing whether the 420 acres included any part of the 100 acres
claimed by the defendant. The court explained that such proof was irrelevant to her ability to conclusively prove that she obtained title to the 420
223
acres by trustee's deed.
In Sani v. Powell,224 a landowner brought a declaratory-judgment action, seeking to have the purchase of his property at a tax sale declared
invalid. In defense, the purchasers of the property asserted that the landowner's action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Dallas Court
of Appeals held that, in order to raise the statute of limitations defense to
an action to clear title to property bought at a tax sale, a party must produce the same documentation required to prove a valid tax sale. Since
the purchasers failed to introduce the decree of foreclosure and order of
sale into evidence, they failed to carry the burden of proving a valid tax
sale so as to be able to assert the statute-of-limitations defense. The court
of appeals also restated that any suit involving a dispute over title to land
is, in effect, an action in trespass to try title, whatever its form. Accordingly, since the declaratory-judgment action in this case was, in essence, a
trespass-to-try title claim, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorney's fees.
In Jordan v. Bustamante,22 5 another tax sale case, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held, among other things, that a disclaimer in a
trespass-to-try-title action could be withdrawn by filing a motion to withdraw the disclaimer with the court. If the court grants the motion, then
the disclaimer is withdrawn; the only way that the opposing party can
challenge the withdrawal is by claiming that the court abused its discretion in granting the motion. The court of appeals also held that a tax sale
is not void simply because the tax authority fails to join a government
entity that has a lien against the property in the suit for delinquent taxes.
Rather, the purchaser of the property just takes the property subject to
221. 158 S.W.3d at 60 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 392.006).
222. 153 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).
223. Id. at 571.
224. 153 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
225. 158 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). See discussion
infra Section IX on ad valorem taxation.
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the lien of the government entity. Finally, the court of appeals held that a
action by assertplaintiff can affirmatively prove title in a trespass-to-try
226
ing and proving title by adverse possession.
A number of cases continued to deal with Martin v. Amerman. In
Jones v. Smith 227 and Aguillera v. The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy
Memorial Foundation,228 the courts of appeals held that a statutory trespass-to-try-title action under Chapter 22 of the Texas Property Code is
the exclusive method to determine a title dispute in Texas. As a result,
the declaratory-judgment action in Jones and the action to remove a
cloud on title in Aguillera were both treated as if they were trespass-totry-title actions. Accordingly, neither plaintiff was entitled to recover attorney's fees. The court of appeals in Jones also held that, in a suit to
establish the boundary between Jones and his neighbor's property, it was
not necessary to fulfill all of the traditional requirements of a formal trespass-to-try-title action.
In Turner v. Mullins,22 9 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that ad-

verse-possession claimants must "wholly exclude" the owner of the disputed property in order to establish title through adverse possession. In
this case, the defendants claimed adverse possession of property located
in the middle of the Red River, but failed to prove to the court that they
wholly excluded the plaintiffs from possession of the property. Evidence
was presented indicating that the plaintiffs used the land over the years
for hunting and swimming, and the defendants had never asked them to
leave. As a result, the court held that the defendants did not prove as a
matter of law that their possession of the disputed property was adverse
or hostile to that of the plaintiffs or that the defendants wholly excluded
the plaintiffs from the disputed property for any of the requisite limitations periods. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's finding that
the defendants did not establish title to the disputed property through
adverse possession.

230

This case also provided a good analysis of accretion. The plaintiffs
claimed that all of the property accreted to their land, which was located
just south of the Red River in Texas. The defendants owned the land
located just north of the Red River in Oklahoma. The court, however,
held that, since the disputed property was once an island, the plaintiffs
were required to prove that they owned the island before accretion to
acquire title to the disputed property. The court explained that if an island is later joined with the mainland through accretion, the owner of the
island is entitled to accretions to the island, just as the owner of the mainland is entitled to accretions to the mainland. Since there was no evidence presented establishing the plaintiffs' ownership of the island, the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 42-43.
157 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
162 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, pet. denied).
162 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
Id. at 366-69.

Real Property

20061

1515

court held that the trial court erred in finding that all of the disputed land
belonged to the plaintiffs. The case was then remanded to the trial court
for a determination
as to which party owned the island before
23 1
accretion.
Finally, in B.W. Carr v. City of Cisco, the Eastland Court of Appeals
permitted the City of Cisco to assert title by limitations, even though,
232
generally, title by limitations cannot be asserted against a municipality.
B.

DEEDS AND CONVEYANCES

Quitclaims took the stage last year, with some odd twists. In Geodyne
Energy Income v. Newton Corp.,23 3 the Texas Supreme Court held that an
assignment by quitclaim of an interest in an expired lease was not a misrepresentation, even if the assignment only resulted in the assumption of
liabilities.
In 1987, Geodyne Energy Income assigned by quitclaim its interest in a
certain oil well to Newton Corp. Three months after the conveyance, the
lease operator informed Newton that the lease had expired and that
Newton would be responsible for the costs of plugging the well. The
lease operator sued both Geodyne and Newton for the cost to plug the
well. Newton asserted that the Assignment and Bill of Sale conveying the
234
lease was a misrepresentation by Geodyne of the validity of the lease.
The court found that the Assignment was a quitclaim, as it did not state
the nature or percentage interest that was being conveyed. Rather, the
Assignment conveyed to Newton "all of [Geodyne's] right, title, and interest" in the lease. 235 The court further held that a quitclaim without a
warranty of title cannot be a warranty or misrepresentation of title, as
quitclaims "are commonly used to convey interests of an unknown extent
'2 36
or claims having a dubious basis.
In Gore Oil Co. v. Roosth,237 the court determined that the deed in

question was ambiguous, as it contained two "subject to" clauses. The
deed in question was a general warranty deed from Peyton McKnight to
Eagle Investment Company and read in part as follows:
Have, Granted, Sold and Conveyed, and by these presents do Grant,
Sell and Convey unto the said Grantee all that certain tract or parcel
of land situated in Knox County Texas, described as follows ("Property"), to wit:
Grantor unto himself, his heirs and assigns, reserves free of all liens a
full one-eighth (1/8) non-participating royalty interest in the Prop231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 360-64.
161 S.W.3d 522 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
161 S.W.3d 482 (Tex. 2005).
Id. at 483-84.
Id. at 486.
Id.
158 S.W.3d 596 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
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as may appear of record in Knox County, Texas.
This conveyance is made and accepted subject to all
ervations, covenants, conditions, rights-of-way and
outstanding and of record, if any,
in Knox County,
2 38
the above described property.
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restrictions, reseasements now
Texas, affecting

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the deed was ambiguous
and that the intent of the parties to the deed was for McKnight to reserve
a full 1/8 royalty interest irrespective of the fact that there existed outstanding mineral and royalty interests that had previously been conveyed
or reserved. The court held that appellees were not estopped from claim239
ing the 1/8 mineral interest under Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
Further, the court held that an affidavit filed in the county clerk's office
was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling that McKnight
intended to reserve a full 1/8 royalty interest unreduced by previous
2 40
reservations.
In Brown v. De La Cruz,24 1 the Texas Supreme Court determined that
Texas Property Code section 5.079(b) does not provide purchasers with a
private cause of action for penalties if a seller of real property fails to
record and transfer a deed within 30 days of final payment. However, a
private cause of action for liquidated damages is available for violations
occurring after amendment of the statute, effective September 1, 2001.242
C.

EASEMENTS

243

In Hubert v. Davis,
the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a
provision in a subdivision declaration created an easement as a matter of
law (rather than a restriction or covenant, which, by the terms of such
declaration, were subject to expiration). 244 Paragraph 13 of the
declaration:
granted unto all owners of lots in said subdivision the free use, liberty
and privilege of passage in and along, over and across all of Lot 9...
for free ingress and egress to said owners with boats, boat trailers
and other vehicles ... the right to temporarily park thereon boats,
boat trailers, and other
vehicles incident to the use of such property
245
as a boat landing.
The court emphasized the significance that the interest was "granted" to
all owners, noting that "the word 'grant' is a word of present conveyance
238. Id. at 598.
239. 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940).
240. See also Dixon v. Dewhurst, 169 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.
h.) (extrinsic evidence was allowed to resolve a conflict and uncertainty between a senior
and junior survey by the same surveyor).
241. 156 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2004). See discussion infra Section VI on purchaser/seller
issues.
242. Id. at 565.
243. 170 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet. h.).
244. Id. at 711.
245. Id. at 708-709 (emphasis added).
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indicating complete alienation. ' 246 The court held that it was reasonable
for the trial court to interpret the language in paragraph 13 to unambiguously create an easement, despite the appellant's argument that such paragraph makes no use of the word "easement;" the court noted that no
special form or words need to be used to create an easement. 247 The
court further held that since the language used in paragraph 13 granted
an easement, the provision in paragraph 14 of the declaration, which imposed a 25-year term on the restrictions and covenants set forth in the
declaration, did not apply to the easement granted by Paragraph 13.248
Not surprisingly, a number of easement cases dealt with public roads.
In Reed v. Wright,249 the court followed the presumption that a road is
public and the reasoning that a road is accepted as a road by reason of its
use. Once a road becomes a public road, it remains so unless clearly
abandoned. Likewise, in Betts v. Reed,250 the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that a road had become a public road through the owner's
implied dedication. This implied dedication arose in part because the
public had used the road, and the county had maintained the road.
Finally, the El Paso Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Long251 went so far

as to infer dimensions for a road created by estoppel. The court held that
the jury's findings were sufficient to establish a road easement by estoppel notwithstanding the absence of (a) a written but unsigned document
or (b) a vendor-vendee relationship. The jury found that the Longs substantially relied on the Murphys' promise to provide a written easement
across the Murphys' land and that such reliance was foreseeable by the
Murphys. 2 52 The El Paso Court of Appeals noted that the rule developed
in "Moore" Burger,253 that a written agreement containing all of the essential elements must be in existence at the time of the promise to sign,
had not been applied to a case involving an easement by estoppel. Even
though the width of the road had not been agreed upon by the parties,
the court pointed out, "dimensions which are reasonably sufficient" could
be inferred for a grant of an easement if the grant provided the object for
which the easement was granted. 2 54 The court declined to follow the
Austin Court of Appeals, which held that the existence of a vendor-vendee relationship is necessary to establish an easement by estoppel. 255 Instead, the court stated that it did not interpret such cases as holding that
246. Id. at 711.
247. Id. at 712 (citing Maples v. Erck, 630 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982,
writ retd n.r.e.)).
248. Id. at 707.
249. 155 S.W.3d 666 (Tex App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
250. 165 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
251. 170 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
252. Id. at 624.
253. Id. at 625 (citing 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.1972) and Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796
(Tex. 1982)).
254. Id. (citing Crawford v. Tenn. Gas Transmission Co., 250 S.W.2d 237, 270 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1952, writ ref'd) and 28 C.J.S. Easements § 77).
255. Id. at 627-28 (citing Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 721 (Tex. App.-Austin
1998, pet. denied)).
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an easement by estoppel could never exist in the absence of a vendorvendee relationship between the parties. 256 Accordingly, the El Paso and
Austin courts may be split as to whether or not a vendor-vendee relationship is required to establish an easement by estoppel.
D.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, CONDOMINIUMS,
AND OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS

In Sloan v. Owners Association of Westfield, Inc.,257 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in a foreclosure action, and in so doing, held that a homeowners association assessment lien could be foreclosed against a lot owner's homestead. The
assessment that formed the basis of the lien examined in Sloan was attorney's fees due under a contingent-fee arrangement. The court of appeals,
citing Inwood North Homeowners' Association v. Harris,258 based its ruling on the fact that the subdivision's declaration provided for the contractual lien, which was in existence before the homestead right.
April Sound Management Corp. v. Concerned Property Owners for
April Sound, Inc. 259 involved deed restrictions in a subdivision. The ap-

pellate court held that a suit for declaratory judgment regarding the right
of a property-management company to enforce deed restrictions required
the joinder of all lot owners and the property owners association as parties. The court based its holding on the principle that all persons who
have or claim any interest that would be affected by a declaratory judgment should be made parties to the action for such judgment, so as to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.
In City of Heath v. Duncan,260 property owners brought an action to
enjoin the city's proposed construction of a park and water tower on subdivision property because the construction violated existing deed restrictions. Following the rationale of City of Houston v. McCarthy,26 1 the
appellate court held that a deed restriction creates a compensable property interest for purposes of condemnation. Further, despite the fact that
the property owners had withdrawn a condemnation award deposited by
the city into the court registry, the court of appeals found that the property owners, as taxpayers, had additional standing to bring their claim for
injunctive relief.
In T.F.W. Management, Inc. v. Westwood Shores Property Owners Association,2 62 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals of Houston reversed the granting of a temporary injunction to a homeowners
association to prevent a country club from using certain lake water to
irrigate its golf course. In reaching its ruling, the appellate court ex256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
167 S.W.3d 401 (Tex.
Id. at 405 (citing 736
153 S.W.3d 519 (Tex.
152 S.W.3d 147 (Tex.
464 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.
162 S.W.3d 564 (Tex.

App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet. h.).
S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987)).
App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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amined the intent of the country club and homeowners association in
drafting their deed and assignment of water rights. Specifically, the court
examined whether the country club was still obligated under the terms of
the instrument to replenish lake water when the price of water had increased nearly tenfold over the course of four years. In holding that the
country club was no longer obligated to provide the water, the appellate
court ruled that the contract requirement that water be available under
substantially similar terms to those at the time of the creation of the requirement (without "adjustments for inflation") was a condition precedent and not a covenant. Therefore, because of the increase in cost,
which was found to exceed "inflation," the court held that the country
club did not satisfy the condition precedent and thus was not obligated to
26 3
replenish the water in the lake.
In Dynamic Public v. Unitec Industrial Center,264 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment regarding the alleged
violation of a deed restriction involving permitted uses of property. In
interpreting a restrictive covenant that incorporated a city ordinance's
definition of "industrial purposes," the appellate court chose not to apply
the expansive interpretation principle of ejusdem generis ("of the same
kind"). Instead, in determining whether an adult book store with nude
dancing constituted use for "industrial purposes," the court looked to the
specific listing of industrial purposes in the city ordinance on which the
restrictive covenant was based. Because additional functions defined as
industrial purposes had been added to the ordinance over time, the court
found that the purpose of the ordinance (and, thus, the deed restriction)
was to create a specific, limiting definition, not an expansive one.
In Marcus v. Whispering Springs Homeowners Association, Inc.,265 the
Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the issuance of a temporary injunction
to a homeowners association. The injunction had been sought by the
homeowners association to prevent a lot owner from building a home
based on plans that had not been submitted to the association's architectural control committee. At the temporary-injunction hearing, there was
testimony that the plans for the construction were the same in all material
ways as plans that had been submitted to the committee; however, there
was also testimony to the contrary by a member of the committee. Affirming the grant of the injunction, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
a showing of imminent harm was not necessary to obtain an injunction in
this case; rather, it was necessary only to show that the intended act
would breach the covenant requiring submission of plans to the architectural control committee.
Voice of Cornerstone Church v. Pizza Property Partners266 involved the
construction of a church on land subject to a restrictive covenant requir263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 569.
167 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet. h.).
153 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
160 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).
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ing commercial or light industrial use. The original grantor of the property brought the claim to enforce the covenant. Finding that the
proposed church construction was in violation of the restrictive covenant,
the court of appeals rejected the appellant church's argument that the
enforcement of the restrictive covenant violated the church purchaser's
state constitutional right to religious freedom and expression. The court
noted that the restriction applied equally to the religious activities of all
denominations and faiths. The appellate court also rejected arguments
that the church activities were merely incidental to the commercial use of
the property (repair shop and printing press that raised money for the
church) and that the covenant in question did not specifically exclude
church uses from appropriate uses.
E.

HOMESTEAD

In Harleaux v. Harleaux, the court acknowledged the special protections afforded to the homestead under the Texas Constitution in holding
that a trial court could not award the payment of attorney's fees from the
proceeds of the sale of the homestead. 267
IX.

BROKERS

A couple of notable cases involving real estate brokers were decided
during the reporting period of this Article.
In American Garment Properties, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis-El Paso,
L. L. C.,268 the El Paso Court of Appeals considered whether a purported
oral modification reducing a broker's commission from the amount specified by written agreement was subject to the statute of frauds provisions
contained in section 20(b) of the Texas Real Estate License Act. 269 In
this case, both a commission agreement and a real estate purchase agreement stated that the broker would receive a commission equal to 6% of
the purchase price. The seller asserted that the commission had been reduced by mutual oral agreement. The seller argued that the statute of
frauds should apply to the broker, but not to the public from whom the
broker was attempting to collect a commission. The court of appeals rejected the seller's interpretation and held that the Real Estate License
Act's statute-of-frauds provisions applied equally to oral modifications of
commission agreements to the public and brokers. Therefore, the purported oral modification was held to be of no effect.
Declining to follow the Texarkana Court of Appeals, 270 the Fourteenth
District Court of Appeals, in Northborough Corporate Limited Partnership, L.L.P. v. Cushman & Wakefield of Texas, Inc.,271 held that section 1101.652(b)(12) of the Texas Occupations Code did not preclude a
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

154
155
See
See
162

S.W.3d 925 (Tex.
S.W.3d 431 (Tex.
TEX. Occ. CODE
Perl v. Patrizi, 20
S.W.3d 816 (Tex.

App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
App.-E1 Paso 2004, no pet. h.).
§ 1101.806(c) (Vernon 2004).
S.W.3d 76 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied).
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
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broker from enforcing a commission agreement that did not contain a
termination date. That statute allows the Texas Real Estate Commission
to suspend or revoke a broker's license if the broker fails to specify a
definite termination date in a commission agreement. Unlike the statute
of frauds provisions, which explicitly impose requirements for the enforceability of a commission agreement, section 1101.652(b)(12) deals
solely with the suspension or revocation of a broker's license. Because
nothing in that section contains a mandate concerning a broker's ability
to maintain an action, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that
a commission agreement lacking a termination date was enforceable.
X.

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, MECHANICS LIEN,
AND CONSTRUCTION ISSUES
In Tarrant County Hospital District v. GE Automation Services, Inc.,272
the court resolved the issue of whether the economic-loss rule is an affirmative defense for which a defendant bears the burden of proof. The
economic-loss rule precludes recovery of economic losses in tort if the
loss is the subject matter of a contract between the parties. If the injury is
only the economic loss that comprises the subject of a contract itself, the
action sounds in contract alone.
In this economic-loss case, the plaintiff hospital district filed suit
against the defendant contractor for breach of warranty, products liability, negligence, and gross negligence related to the defendant's failure to
provide and construct a safe and reliable power-supply system. The trial
court granted the defendant's summary judgment that dismissed plaintiff's tort claims, as the damages alleged were damages from the economic
loss to the subject of the contract between the parties. The appellate
court affirmed. The court further held that the economic-loss rule is not
an affirmative defense within the meaning of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94 but a court-adopted rule for interpreting whether a party is
barred from seeking damages in an action for tort injuries resulting from
273
a contract between the parties.
In Wesco Distribution,Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc.,274 the court analyzed whether a subcontractor's failure to tender payment to a material
supplier substantially complied with the requisite notice provisions of the
Texas Property Code to perfect a materialman's lien since the notice was
mailed to the general contractor and returned. Wesco Distribution, Inc.
was a material supplier to J&D Electric, a subcontractor for a project on
which Westport Group, Inc. was the general contractor. On July 11, 2001,
Wesco attempted to send notice to Westport of J&D's failure to pay for
materials furnished. The post office returned the notice to Wesco for insufficient postage. On July 25, 2001, Wesco added postage and again
mailed its notice. On July 19, 2001, Westport, having not received notice
272. 156 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
273. Id. at 895-96.
274. 150 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
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of Wesco's claim, made a payment to J&D. 275
The court held that, even though the materialman's lien statute is liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen,
Wesco's attempt to properly mail the notice did not substantially comply
with the statute. The court concluded that Wesco's notice did not satisfy
the notice deadline mandated by the statute, and therefore, it did not
276
perfect its mechanic's lien.
In Hassell Construction Co., Inc. v. Stature Commercial Co., Inc.,277 a
general contractor sought to avoid liability for payment to a subcontractor under a provision in the subcontract, which stated that the subcontractor's payment from the general contractor was contingent upon
payment to the general contractor by the owner. The court held that in
order to avoid liability in this basis, the general contractor must specifically plead the relative language of the contract as an affirmative defense
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 94.
In a case of first impression, the court in Advanced Temporaries,Inc. v.
Reliance Surety Co.278 analyzed whether a temporary-employment
agency that provided employees to a subcontractor was entitled to the
protections afforded laborers and materialmen under the mechanic's-lien
statute. The Texas mechanic's-lien statute affords protection to those furnishing labor and materials in the construction of improvements to real
property. Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code defines "labor" as "la'2 79
bor used in the direct prosecution of the work.
The factors to be considered in determining whether a temporary-employment agency furnished labor "in direct prosecution of the work" include: the temporary-employment agency's involvement in selecting and
screening the workers for hire; the agency's use of its own criteria for
hiring the workers; the agency's affirmative representations to the workers that it is their employer; the nature of documentation exchanged between the workers and the agency at the start of the working relationship;
the agency's involvement in training, supervising, and disciplining the
workers and otherwise retaining control over the workers or directing
their behavior; whether the agency, rather than the contractor, determined which workers could be terminated; and whether the agency with2 80
held workers rather than services on nonpayment by the contractor.
The court held that Advanced Temporaries, Inc. furnished "labor in
direct prosecution of the work" and therefore, was entitled to the protections under the mechanic's-lien statute, as it recruited carpenters and laborers to work on the project, qualified the workers by verifying legal
documentation, hired all the workers as its own employees, and provided
all workers compensation, unemployment insurance, and general-liability
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 556-61.
162 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
165 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. granted).
TEX. PROP. CODE § 53.001 et seq. (Vernon 1995).
Advanced Temps., 165 S.W.3d at 6.
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insurance. In addition, all
workers hired by Advanced received
28 1
paychecks from Advanced.
In PalladianBuilding Co., Inc. v. Nortex Foundation Designs, Inc., the
court held that if suit is brought against a "design professional" under
section 150 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the plaintiff fails to file the requisite affidavit of a third-party design professional,
it is within the trial282court's discretion whether to dismiss the case with or
without prejudice.
In In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,283 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement
can be compelled to arbitrate. In October of 1999, MacGregor (USA)
entered into a contract with Ingalls Shipbuilding to build elevator trunks
for cruise ships. Subsequently, MacGregor (USA) assigned the contract
to MacGregor (FIN). MacGregor (FIN) subcontracted a portion of the
work to Unidynamics. The subcontract between MacGregor (FIN) and
Unidynamics (the "Fabrication Subcontract") contained an arbitration
provision that stated any dispute arising from the contract "shall be settled by arbitration. '284 Unidynamics then entered into a second-tier subcontract with Kellogg Brown & Root ("KBR") under which KBR would
furnish labor and materials in the construction of the elevator trunks.
The subcontract between Unidynamics and KBR did not contain an arbitration provision.
In 2001, the buyer of the cruise ships declared bankruptcy. Thereafter,
Ingalls directed MacGregor (FIN) to cease work. MacGregor (FIN) then
directed Unidynamics and KBR to cease work under their respective subcontracts. KBR then sent invoices to Unidynamics for labor and materials furnished before the work stopped. Further, because KBR had not
been paid, it asserted liens on the elevator trunk and other materials. A
dispute arose between MacGregor (FIN) and Unidynamics as to who
owed KBR for its labor and materials furnished in the construction of the
2 85
elevator trunks.
In May of 2002, MacGregor (FIN) asked that its dispute with
Unidynamics be resolved through arbitration as set forth in the
Fabrication Subcontract. Unidynamics and MacGregor commenced arbitration. As the arbitration proceeded, KBR filed suit in Harris County,
Texas. MacGregor (FIN) filed a motion to abate the state-court action
and a motion to compel KBR to pursue its claims in the ongoing arbitration. The trial court denied MacGregor's motions, but the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to enter an
order compelling KBR to arbitrate its claims in the arbitration
2 86
proceedings.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id.
165 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005).
Id. at 735.

285. Id.

286. Id. at 736.
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The Texas Supreme Court analyzed whether KBR could be compelled
to arbitrate its claims based on the federal doctrine of "direct benefits
estoppel." The doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel recognizes that a
party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause if he has consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be
enforced to benefit him. The primary issue before the court was whether
KBR could be compelled to bring its quantum meruit claim in
2 87
arbitration.
The court held that although a non-signatory's claim may relate to a
contract containing an arbitration provision, that relationship does not in
itself bind the non-signatory to the arbitration provision. The court further held that a non-signatory should be compelled to arbitrate only if it
seeks, through the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration provision. The court found that in its quantum
meruit claim, KBR sought payment from MacGregor for services furnished under KBR's contract with Unidynamics, which did not contain an
arbitration provision. Therefore, KBR's quantum meruit claim was not
288
subject to arbitration.
XI.

AD VALOREM TAXATION

In Henry v. Kaufman County Development DistrictNo. 1,289 a group of
homeowners brought a declaratory-judgment action challenging the validity of special assessments levied by the county development district to
pay for certain infrastructure improvements. The Austin Court of Appeals held, among other things, that the homeowners were not required
to exhaust administrative remedies before asserting their declaratoryjudgment action because the issue of whether assessments are validly levied under statutory authority is purely a question of law. Further, the
County Development District Act, which created the county development district, did not incorporate the "procedures" or "remedies" provisions of the Texas Local Government Code. After determining that the
homeowners' action was valid, the court of appeals ruled in favor of the
homeowners, holding that the county development district lacked the
statutory authority to levy special assessments. The court of appeals explained that the power to tax may only be exercised by a political subdivision if the power has been "expressly" conferred by constitution or
legislation. The county development district argued that the County Development District Act gave it the power to levy special assessments because it gave county development districts the same powers as municipal
management districts, and municipal management districts were given
such power. The court, however, held that, since the Act did not ex287. Id. at 737.
288. Id. at 740-41.
289. 150 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. granted).
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pressly give county development districts the power to levy special assessments, the district was barred from doing so as a matter of law.
In National Medical Financial Services, Inc. v. Irving Independent
School District,290 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that, once the taxing
authority, in a suit to collect a delinquent real-property tax, introduces its
current tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the property and
the amount of tax and penalties imposed and interest accrued, such
records establish a prima facie case that the taxes in question are due,
delinquent, and unpaid. If such a case is made, it is assumed that the
taxpayer owned the property on January 1 of the year for which the tax
was imposed. The burden then shifts to the taxpayer to show, by introducing competent evidence, that he has paid the full amount of the taxes,
penalties, and interest, or that there is some other defense that applies to
his case.
In City of Heath v. Duncan,2 91 owners of certain property in a subdivision brought an action seeking injunctive relief against the city for its
proposed construction of a park and water tower in the subdivision. The
city filed a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, claiming that the
property owners lacked standing. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's ruling that the property owners had standing, holding
that the property owners had "taxpayer standing" to challenge the city's
expenditure of public funds to construct a water tower on property previously dedicated for a municipal park. Specifically, the property owners
claimed that the expenditure was illegal in that the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code required notice and a public hearing before park land could be
converted to another type of use. Thus, the court held that the property
owners had standing to sue in equity to enjoin the illegal expenditure of
public funds. According to the court, such a suit is a "long-established"
exception to the requirement that a taxpayer establish a particularized
injury in order to have standing to challenge government action.
In Gilmer Independent School District v. Dorfman, the Tyler Court of
Appeals held that the Commissioner of Education is an indispensable
party and, therefore, must be joined to any suit challenging the constitutionality of Chapters 41 and 42 of the Texas Education Code because he
292
is the official with primary responsibility for Code enforcement.
In Jordan v. Bustamante,2 93 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
held, among other things, that a tax sale is not void simply because the
tax authority fails to join a government entity that has a lien against the
property to the suit to prosecute the delinquent taxes. Rather, the purchaser of the property takes the property subject to the government entity's lien. The court of appeals also held that prior owners of lands sold
290. 150 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
291. 152 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
292. 156 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.).
293. 158 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). See discussion
supra Section VIIIA in adverse possession.
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at tax sales do not have standing to complain, in a trespass-to-try-title
action with the purchaser of the lands, of any alleged injury to the State
or the Internal Revenue Service due to the failure of the taxing unit to
join them as parties to the suit to prosecute the delinquent taxes. Finally,
the court of appeals held that a purchaser of lands at a tax sale is not
required, in a trespass-to-try-title action with the prior owners of the
lands, to introduce the tax judgment and order of sale in order to rely on
the one-year statute of limitations that applies to actions challenging title
to real estate conveyed in tax sales.
In MAG-T, L.P. v. Travis Central Appraisal District,2 94 several taxpayers brought suit against the appraisal district, appraisal review board, and
tax-assessor collector, seeking a declaratory judgment that the taxing authorities improperly increased taxes after the appraisal roll had already
been certified. Since the taxing authorities have exclusive jurisdiction
over tax disputes, the court of appeals held that the taxpayers were not
excused from exhausting their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the complained-of activity. The court of appeals also held
that the alleged defects in notice of the new taxes did not violate due
process in such a way as to allow the taxpayers to avoid exhausting their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Finally, the court
of appeals held that the taxpayers were not excused from exhausting their
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review because the remedies offered by the Tax Code were "inadequate" or that the questions
raised were "pure questions of law."
In Strayhorn v. Willow Creek Resources, Inc.,2 95 the Austin Court of
Appeals held that an informal review of a corporation's tax-refund claim
was an "administrative proceeding" for purposes of a statute that tolled
the statute of limitations for filing a refund claim.
In Interstate Apartment Enterprises, L.C. v. Wichita Appraisal District,2 96 a taxpayer brought a declaratory-judgment action, seeking a declaration that the valuation for its apartment complex was void due to the
appraisal district's failure to give notice of the valuation increase and the
district's provision of misleading information regarding which remedy to
pursue. The taxpayer also requested a refund, claiming that the taxes
should have been assessed and levied based on a prior valuation. The
trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction based on the taxpayer's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On appeal, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal order pertaining to jurisdiction over the lack-of-notice issue, but reversed the part of the dismissal
order pertaining to jurisdiction over the overvaluation of the apartment
complex. The court of appeals explained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the overvaluation claim because the taxpayer filed a motion to
correct the appraisal roll. Accordingly, the trial court could decide
294. 161 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.-Austin, pet. denied).
295. 161 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).
296. 164 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
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whether the appraisal review board properly denied the taxpayer's
motion.
In Matagorda County Appraisal District v. Coastal Liquids Partners,
L.P.,297 the Texas Supreme Court held that some aspects of real property
can be taxed separately even though all are part of the same surface tract.
As a result, the appraisal district was allowed to value underground saltdome caverns created to store liquid hydrocarbons separately from the
value of the surface estate. The supreme court also held that the appraisal district's listing of the underground salt-dome hydrocarbon-storage caverns as "Improvements" or "Other" was not double taxation,
despite the allegation that caverns did not fall within any of the six categories of real property. The supreme court reasoned that that Tax Code
did not expressly require real property to fit into any of the six categories,
and the caverns, which were man-made, could be treated like improvements, much like any above-ground storage facility.
In American Housing Foundation v. Brazos County Appraisal District, 298 a community housing-development organization controlled 100%
of the general partner of the limited partnership, which owned low-income housing apartments. The Waco Court of Appeals held that the
community housing-development organization was not entitled to a property-tax exemption under Texas Tax Code section 11.182 because the organization was not the "record owner" of the apartments, as the statute
required.
XII.

ENTITIES

In Kenworthy v. Kenworthy Corporation,2 99 several limited partners of
a limited partnership sued the sole general partner, seeking dissolution of
the limited partnership. After the suit for dissolution had been pending
for more than 120 days, the limited partners moved for, and the trial
court granted, partial summary judgment on the ground that, under section 4.02(a)(5) of Article 6132a-1 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act,30 0 the general partner ceased to be the general partner upon the
passage of more than 120 days without the dismissal of the lawsuit resulting in the dissolution of the limited partnership. Section 4.02(a)(5) of
Article 6132a-1 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act provides
that "[a] person ceases to be a general partner of a limited partnership on
the occurrence of any of the following events of withdrawal ... (5) 120
days expire after the date of the commencement of a preceding against
the general partner seeking reorganization, arrangement, composition,
readjustment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief under any law if
the proceeding has not been previously dismissed ...."301 The appellate
297.
298.
299.
300.

165 S.W.3d 329
166 S.W.3d 885
149 S.W.3d 296
TEX. REv. Civ.

301. Id.

(Tex. 2005).
(Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed).
(Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. denied).
STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 4.02(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
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court reversed the trial court's determination and held that section
4.02(a)(5) of Article 6132a-1 of the Texas Revised Limited Partnership
Act did not apply to lawsuits against a general partner to dissolve the
limited partnership, but rather only to actions against the general partner
for the dissolution or reorganization of the general partner.
In Apcar Investment Partners VI, Ltd. v. Gaus,30 2 Apcar, a commercial
landlord, filed suit for breach of lease against its tenant, Smith & West,
L.L.P., a Texas limited liability partnership, and Gaus and West, two of
the partners of Smith & West, L.L.P., individually. The trial court
granted summary judgment to Gaus and West on the ground that, as partners in a registered limited liability partnership, they were not individually liable for the partnership's obligations under the lease. The court of
appeals, however, reversed the determination of the trial court, holding
that the partners were individually liable because Smith & West, L.L.P.
failed to comply with the statutory annual renewal requirements imposed
by Article 6132b-3.08(a)(1) of the Texas Revised Partnership Act 30 3 and
had entered into the lease three years after the partnership's status as a
registered limited liability partnership expired. Relying on cases involving the statutory filing requirements for limited partnerships, Gaus and
West argued that the limited liability partnership was not required to
strictly comply with the statutory renewal requirements to maintain its
status as a registered limited liability partnership and to protect the partners from individual liability. The court of appeals disagreed, stating that
the Texas Revised Partnership Act clearly provides that a partner in a
registered limited liability partnership is not individually liable for debts
and obligation incurred while the partnership is a registeredlimited liability partnership and that registration expires after one year unless renewed before the expiration date. The court of appeals also noted that
the statute does not contain a substantial-compliance provision or a grace
period for filing for renewal. Because Smith & West, L.L.P. was not a
registered limited liability partnership when it made and entered into the
lease, Gaus and West were not protected from individual liability for the
30 4
lease obligations.
In Emmett Properties, Inc. v. HalliburtonEnergy Services, Inc.,3°5 the
court of appeals held that the reinstatement of a dissolved corporation to
active status did not revive the corporation's claims that were extin30 6
guished under Article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.
Emmett filed a lawsuit against Halliburton more than three years after
Emmett had forfeited its corporate charter under the Texas Tax Code for
delinquent franchise taxes. The Court of Appeals noted that Article 7.12
of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides that (i) an existing claim
by a "dissolved corporation" is extinguished unless an action or proceed302. 161 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
303. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.08(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).

304. Id. at 139-42.
305. 167 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
306. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art 7.12, § C (Vernon 2003).
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ing on the existing claims is brought within three years of dissolution, and
(ii) a "dissolved corporation" includes a corporation whose charter is forfeited under the Texas Tax Code, unless the forfeiture has been set aside.
The court of appeals rejected Emmett's argument that the subsequent
reinstatement of its corporate charter and privileges, after payment of its
delinquent taxes four and a half years after its forfeiture, revived the extinguished claims. The court noted that there is no statutory provision
reversing the extinguishment of claims under Article 7.12 of the Texas
Business Corporation Act. Further, the Texas Tax Code provides that a
corporation's corporate privileges and charter are restored upon the paydoes
not provide that the corporation's exment of delinquent taxes, but 30
7
tinguished claims are revived.
In Reagan v. Lyberger,30 8 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court
determination that a partnership existed between Mike Anderson, a
house contractor, and Mike Reagan, his accountant, with regard to the
construction of the Lyberger's home. Citing the Texas Revised Partnership Act, the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that the factors indicating
the creation of a partnership include: (1) receipt or right to receive a
share of profits of the business; (2) expression of intent to be partners in
the business; (3) participation or right to participate in control of the business; (4) sharing or agreeing to share losses of the business or liability for
claims by third parties against the business; and (5) contributing or agreeing to contribute money or property to the business. Not all of these
factors need to be present for a partnership to exist, and no one factor is
dispositive. The appellate court found that because Lyberger had
presented evidence that factors (2), (3), and (5) existed between Reagan
and Anderson when their house was being built, the evidence was suffiengaged
cient to support a jury's finding that Regan and Anderson were
30 9
in a partnership as to construction of the Lyberger's home.
However, in Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso,3 10 the El Paso
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court determination that Robert Samuel was a partner in a joint venture. Citing a Texas Supreme Court
case, the court of appeals stated that that there are four required elements of a partnership: (1) a community of interest in the venture; (2) an
agreement to share profits; (3) an agreement to share losses; and (4) a
mutual right of control or management of the enterprise. A finding of a
partnership cannot be upheld if there is no evidence of any one of these
elements. 31 1 The court of appeals found that because there was no evidence of an agreement to share profits or losses or of a mutual right of
control or management of the enterprise, Samuel was not a partner in the
joint venture.
307. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.312-.313 (Vernon Supp. 2003).
308. 156 S.W.3d 925 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
309. Id. at 928.
310. 155 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied).
311. Id. at 507-08 (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176
(Tex. 1997).
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INDEMNITIES

In Oxy USA, Inc., v. Southwestern Energy,312 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Southwestern Energy Production Company, the indemnitor. Oxy USA and Southwestern
Energy had entered into an oil-prospecting agreement for a particular
tract of land known as the Bour6 Project. Southwestern Energy subsequently entered into several contractual arrangements for the Bour6 Project with third parties that were inconsistent with the Oxy USA
agreement. In order to continue the oil-exploration agreement between
Southwestern Energy and Oxy USA, Southwestern Energy agreed to
honor only its agreement with Oxy USA with respect to the Bour6 Project and to indemnify Oxy USA for claims by the third parties. Certain
third parties sued Oxy USA, claiming tortious interference with a contract, conversion, and abuse of rights, and Oxy USA demanded that
Southwestern Energy defend and indemnify Oxy USA under the indemnity agreement. Southwestern Energy originally agreed, but later refused, claiming that the indemnity agreement was unenforceable based
on the fair-notice doctrine, public policy, and other claims. The court of
appeals first upheld prior rulings that the fair-notice doctrine applies only
to indemnities against future actions, not past actions. Interestingly, the
court of appeals was reluctant to extend the fair-notice doctrine to cases
in which the parties were large sophisticated companies with relatively
equal bargaining power. The appellate court then found that the indemnity agreement did not violate public policy. Southwestern Energy argued that agreements relieving a party of financial responsibility for its
actions would encourage behavior detrimental to society, and thus, such
agreements were unenforceable as against public policy. The appellate
court found that such arguments were inapplicable because the agreement pertained only to actions that occurred before the indemnity agreement and because the underlying rationale of the indemnity agreement
was that the indemnitee would be held harmless from the misconduct of
the indemnitor. The appellate court therefore held that the indemnity
agreement was enforceable against Southwestern Energy and granted
31 3
Oxy USA's summary-judgment motion.
XIV.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS
NUISANCE/TRESPASS

In Schneider National Carriers,Inc. v. Bates,314 a number of residents
living near the Houston Ship Channel brought suit, complaining of a
number of conditions created by industrial plants, including air contaminants, odors, lights, and noise. While the plaintiffs asserted a number of
causes of action, the issue presented to the Texas Supreme Court was
312. 161 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed).
313. Id. at 283-87.
314. 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
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whether the plaintiffs' nuisance claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 3 15 Under Texas law, "[a] permanent nuisance claim
accrues when injury first occurs or is discovered; a temporary nuisance
claim accrues anew upon each injury.

'

316

Accordingly, the application of

the statute of limitations to nuisance claims turns on whether the alleged
activities are "permanent" or "temporary" nuisances.
A permanent nuisance involves "an activity of such character and existing under such circumstances that it will be presumed to continue indefinitely," and therefore, the injury from such activity "constantly and
regularly recurs. '317 Conversely, a temporary nuisance is of "limited duration," and it is "uncertain if any future injury will occur, or if future
injury is liable to occur only at long intervals. '318 While these definitions
are seemingly straightforward, the Texas Supreme Court noted that a
number of cases with similar facts have resulted in very different results, 319 theorizing that half of those cases must have been decided incorrectly because "they are simply unreconcilable. ' 320 The court undertook
a lengthy discussion of the history of classifying a nuisance as either permanent or temporary and concluded that the distinction "should be applied using the same standard of reference that applies to the
consequences flowing from it.' ' 321 Therefore, a nuisance is permanent if
the nuisance occurs several times in the years leading up to trial and is
likely to continue, thereby providing enough evidence as to frequency
and duration of the alleged activity as to allow jurors to reasonably evaluate the impact of such activity on the neighboring property values. Conversely, a nuisance is temporary only if it is so irregular or intermittent
over the period leading up to trial that the future impact remains speculative and cannot be estimated with reasonable centrality.
When applying these definitions to the case at bar, the Texas Supreme
Court noted that affidavits submitted in support of the plaintiffs' claims
generally described nuisances that were "continuous," "ongoing," "regular," and "frequent. '322 Other characterizations of the alleged nuisances
included adjectives such as "constantly" or "always.

' 3 23

While differ-

ences apparently existed regarding how often the conditions allegedly in315. See TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 2005).
316. Schneider Nat'l Carriers,Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 270 (emphasis in original).

317. Id. at 272.
318. Id.

319. Compare Kraft v. Langford, 565 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1978); City of Amarillo v. Ware,
40 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1931); Parsons v. Uvalde Elec. Light Co., 163 S.W. 1 (Tex. 1914); Rosenthal v. Taylor, B. & H. Ry. Co., 15 S.W. 268 (Tex. 1891); City of Lubbock v. Tice, 517
S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ); Meat Producers, Inc. v. McFarland,
476 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Gulf Coast Sailboats, Inc. v.
McGuire, 616 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Youngblood's Inc. v. Goebel, 404 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
320. Schneider Nat'l Carriers,Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 274.

321. Id. at 280.
322. Id. at 290.
323. Id.
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terfered with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their respective
properties, the nuisances consistently existed for many years beyond the
two-year period preceding the suit, and none of the conditions were so
sporadic or unpredictable that a jury would have to speculate as to their
effect on the plaintiffs' property values. Accordingly, the court held that
the nuisances alleged by the plaintiffs were permanent nuisances and, as a
matter of law, barred by the statute of limitations.
B.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

In In re Cerberus Capital Management, L.P.,324 WSNet Holdings, Inc.
hired a law firm to draft an asset purchase agreement for the purchase of
certain assets of Classic Communications, Inc. The firm prepared the
agreement, but WSNet instructed the firm that all work on the matter
should cease. A year later, a WSNet shareholder instituted a shareholder
derivative suit against the relators, alleging that the relators had usurped
WSNet's corporate opportunity to purchase the assets of Classic Communications, Inc. The relators contacted the firm regarding representation.
The firm asked WSNet if they would waive any potential conflict, and
they agreed verbally and in writing. WSNet later filed bankruptcy, and
the trustee sought to have the firm disqualified, claiming that the waiver
letter signed by WSNet was ineffective because it did not fully disclose
the conflict. The trial court ordered disqualification, and the firm sought
a writ of mandamus. The Texas Supreme Court held that the conflict was
fully and accurately described in the waiver letter, and the writ was therefore granted.
In Industrial Clearinghouse,Inc. v. Jackson Walker, L.L.P.,325 Jackson
Walker represented Coastal Plains, Inc. in a prior bankruptcy proceeding.
While that case was pending, Industrial Clearinghouse, Inc. purchased
several of Coastal's assets, including its causes of action against Browning
Manufacturing, Coastal's biggest supplier. Industrial Clearinghouse pursued the Browning causes of action, but the claims were judicially estopped because Coastal never disclosed the Browning claims in its
bankruptcy schedules. Industrial Clearinghouse then brought suit against
Jackson Walker, alleging that Jackson Walker was (i) negligent in failing
to disclose the Browning claims in bankruptcy court and (ii) negligent in
assisting Industrial Clearinghouse in the purchase of the Browning
claims. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Jackson
Walker, and Industrial Clearinghouse appealed. Industrial Clearinghouse
acknowledged that the bankruptcy estate initially owned the malpractice
claims against Jackson Walker, but claimed that the malpractice claims
were abandoned to them as Coastal's successor. They relied on section
554(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that any property scheduled under section 521(1) and not otherwise administered at the time of
324. 164 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. 2005).
325. 162 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
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the closing of the case is automatically abandoned to the debtor. 326
The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court judgment.
The appellate court ruled that the only property required to be scheduled
under section 521(1) is property owned by the debtor when the bankruptcy is filed. 327 The malpractice claims arose after the bankruptcy was
filed, so they remained the property of the bankruptcy estate. In addition, Industrial Clearinghouse failed to show that Jackson Walker's actions were the proximate cause of Industrial Clearinghouse's failure to
prevail on the Browning claims; therefore, Industrial Clearinghouse could
not recover under its claim that Jackson Walker was negligent in assisting
in the purchase of the Browning claims.
In Greenberg Traurig of New York v. Moody,328 Greenberg Traurig
agreed to represent Integrated Food Technologies Corporation ("IFT")
in connection with general corporate affairs, an initial public offering, and
other securities matters. Several investors were then persuaded to invest
in IFf based on certain misrepresentations made by IFT's chief executive
officer. IFf later filed for bankruptcy protection, and the investors sued
Greenberg on claims of violations of Texas security laws, Texas statutory
fraud, common-law fraud, and conspiracy. The trial court ruled in favor
of IFF on all claims, and Greenberg appealed. The court of appeals held
that it was incorrect for the trial court to apply Texas law to the investors'
claims, and that, under the "most significant relationship test" contained
in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws, 32 9 New York law
should have been applied. Under New York law, there is no private claim
for statutory securities fraud, a Texas statutory fraud claim under section
27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code was not applicable, and
there can be no recovery for common-law fraud in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Accordingly, those portions of the verdict were reversed, and the court rendered judgment that the investors take nothing.
Although there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of a conspiracy between Greenberg and IFf, the appellate court held
that the trial court erred in submitting certain expert testimony and that
the error was harmful. Thus, this portion of the verdict was accordingly
reversed and remanded for new trial.
In Oscar M. Telfair, III, P.C. v. Bridges,330 the law firm of Oscar M.
Telfair, III, P.C. represented Merita and Marvin Bridges in connection
with a personal-injury claim and another unrelated lawsuit. Telfair later
sued the Bridges over a fee dispute in the unrelated matter, and the
Bridges counterclaimed, alleging that Telfair misappropriated settlement
funds obtained by Telfair on the Bridges' behalf in the personal-injury
matter. The trial court awarded the Bridges damages and attorney's fees
326. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c).
327. See 4 COLLIER OF BANKRUPTCY $ 521.06[3][a] (15th rev. ed. 2002).
328. 161 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
329. Id. at 70 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 (1971).
330. 161 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).

1534

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

on the counterclaim, and Telfair appealed. The Eastland Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney's fees because there was no legal
basis for the awarding of attorney's fees. The general rule is that attor331
ney's fees are not recoverable unless allowed by contract or statute.
There is a narrow equitable exception to the general rule, but it only applies when a wrongful act requires the claimant to incur attorney's fees in
prior litigation involving a third party. 332 Since the Bridges were seeking
attorney's fees in the original litigation with the party alleged to have
committed the wrongful act, their claim for attorney's fees did not fall
within the equitable exception. The court also held that the Bridges were
not entitled to recover their attorney's fees under section 38.001 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because they had brought a conof action under the statute for which
version claim, which is not a cause
333
attorney's fees are recoverable.
In Wilborn v. GE Marquette Medical Systems, Inc.,334 and Wilborn v.
Life Ambulance Services, Inc.,335 the Estate of Edward Wilborn sued various defendants on claims arising out of Edward Wilborn's death. The
Estate was represented by two attorneys, one of which withdrew before
trial. The Estate filed a motion for continuance with respect to a motion
for summary judgment hearing, contending that when the Estate's attorney withdrew, the trial court had to allow the Estate thirty days to find a
new attorney. The trial court denied the motion, and the Estate appealed. Since the order allowing the withdrawal did not reference any
time limit to retain new counsel, and inasmuch as the Estate was at no
time unrepresented by counsel (since only one of their two attorneys
withdrew from the case), the El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.
In Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. v. French,336 the law of firm of
Windle Turley sued certain former clients to recover attorney's fees incurred in connection with a medical-malpractice claim. The former clients filed various counterclaims and moved for sanctions. The trial court
awarded the former clients the requested sanctions and contingent appellate attorney's fees (in the event that the former clients unsuccessfully
appealed the final judgment). Windle Turley appealed, and the Dallas
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Windle Turley originally filed suit in the Tarrant County court. When it became apparent to
Windle Turley that it was going to lose in that trial court, Windle Turley
then filed the same claims in the Dallas County court. Since the trial
court could have determined that Windle Turley filed suit in Dallas
County merely to circumvent an imminent adverse ruling in Tarrant
County (an improper purpose for filing suit), the appellate court held that
331. Id. at 170.
332. Id.

§ 38.001 (Vernon 1997).
334. 163 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
335. 163 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
336. 164 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
333. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
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the sanctions were proper.337 The court also held that the conditional
attorney's fees were not a monetary penalty against Windle Turley for
exercising its legal rights because the award of attorney's fees was conditioned on the former clients' failure to obtain relief.
In Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse,33s Cruse represented Diana Kinnebrew in a suit to recover damages arising from a car accident.
During the suit's pendency, Cruse sent an unsolicited letter of protection
to Advantage Physical Therapy, stating that fees owed by Kinnebrew
would be protected out of any recovery made in the suit. Cruse obtained
a -final judgment in the suit awarding payment of his legal fees, but no
money was paid to Advantage. Advantage then sued for breach of the
letter of protection. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in
Cruse's favor, and Advantage appealed. The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court ruling, holding that Cruse's original letter was merely an
offer that Advantage never accepted. 339 Since the offer was never accepted, no contract was formed, and the letter of protection was therefore
unenforceable.
C.

MINERALS

In Ridge Oil Company, Inc. v. Guinn Investments, Inc.,340 two lessees,
Guinn Investments, Inc. and Ridge Oil Company, obtained certain oil
and gas interests through assignments under a 1937 oil and gas lease covering two adjoining 160-acre tracts of land. The producing well on the
Guinn tract was plugged and abandoned in 1950, but two producing wells
on the Ridge tract sustained the 1937 lease as to both the Ridge tract and
the Guinn tract. 341 Ridge attempted to terminate the 1937 lease by shutting down the two producing wells and entering into new leases with the
342
mineral-interest owners solely on the Ridge tract.
Guinn contended that the 1937 lease had not terminated as to its tract
because the cessation of well production was temporary. The issue was
therefore whether a temporary cessation of production existed under the
facts of the case. 343 Guinn first claimed that a lessee cannot surrender or
terminate a lease or destroy the rights of another partial assignee of the
lessee's interest. However, the Texas Supreme Court held that Ridge did
not owe any duty to Guinn to continue the 1937 lease in effect, reasoning
that Ridge is not Guinn's lessor and that no action taken by Ridge with
regard to the Ridge tract had any impact on Guinn's ability to commence
or maintain operations on the Guinn tract. Guinn could have continued
the 1937 lease by drilling a well and obtaining production or continuing
operations until production was obtained. The fact that new leases were
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. at 492.
165 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
Id. at 25-26.
148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
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executed on the Ridge tract had no effect on Guinn's ability to conduct
such operations.

344

Second, Guinn contended that the 1937 lease had not terminated as to
the Guinn tract because Guinn had begun operations on such tract before
the lease expired and was prevented from continuing those operations by
Ridge's conduct. 345 Therefore, a fact question existed as to whether "operations were being carried on" sufficient to sustain the lease. The Texas
Supreme Court found that a 25-day period, after production under the
to
1937 lease permanently ceased, in which Guinn conducted no activities 346
obtain production, as a matter of law, did not satisfy the requirement.
In Mission Resources Inc. v. Garza Energy Trust,3 4 7 the issue was
whether "fracing" (or hydraulic fracturing) as a secondary method used
to increase the production from oil and gas wells constituted a subsurface
trespass under Texas law. 348 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals stated
that it did constitute a trespass. The court relied on Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor
Oil Co., 3 4 9 which held that fracing can constitute a subsurface trespass.
In so relying, the court stated its belief that the supreme court's decision
in that case was not merely dictum. 350 The Court of Appeals rejected the
finding of its sister court in Texarkana, in Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee
stating that
Operating Co., 3 5 1 which reached the opposite conclusion,
3 52

Gregg holds precedential value and remains the law.
D.

Lis PENDENS

353
In In re Collins, Fountain Mall, Inc., and Mall Group, Ltd., Realtors,
former partners in a partnership that owned a shopping mall ("Collins")
brought action against other partners and a party affiliated with the other
partners ("Kest Parties"), alleging fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in
connection with foreclosure on a mall and seeking a declaration that Collins owned 50% of the mall. Collins argued that he let the lender foreclose upon a mall that he and the Kest Parties owned as a result of a side
agreement between Collins and the Kest Parties, which stated that, in the
event that the Kest Parties purchased the mall at the foreclosure sale,
Collins would retain its 50% ownership interest in the mall through the
new purchasing entity. When the mall was purchased at foreclosure by
the Kest Parties and no ownership interest was granted to Collins, Collins
brought action and filed a lis pendens against the mall property. The Kest
Parties argued that no such agreement was made and that Collins had no
344.
345.

Id. at 155.
Id. at 149.

346. Id. at 160.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

166 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. filed).
Id. at 309.
162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
Mission Res., 166 S.W.3d at 310.
817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), rev'd by 839 S.W.2d 797 (1992).
Mission Res., 166 S.W.3d at 311.
172 S.W.3d 287 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).
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interest in the property. The trial court granted the Kest Parties' motion
to void the lis pendens. Collins filed for a writ of mandamus, alleging that
the trial court had to look solely at the pleadings of the party who filed
the notice of lis pendens to determine whether the party is claiming a
direct or collateral interest in the real property at issue. If there is a question of fact regarding the nature of the alleged property interest, the court
may not dismiss a lis pendens.354 The court of appeals agreed, holding
that if the evidence raises an issue of fact regarding whether the alleged
property interest is a direct interest, the motion to void the lis pendens
should be denied, and the issue should be resolved by the fact finder; if,
however, the relevant evidence is undisputed, or fails to raise a fact question concerning the true nature of the alleged property interest, the trial
court should rule on the validity of the lis pendens as a matter of law. In
this case, Collins undoubtedly claimed a direct interest in the mall property, and the Kest Parties' motion to void the lis pendens challenged the
existence of facts supporting Collins' alleged direct interest in the mall
property. Because there was a fact issue on whether Collins had a direct
interest in the mall property, as alleged in his pleading, the appellate
court held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting the Kest
Parties' motion. Therefore, the writ of mandamus was granted.
E.

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACIICES

Acr

In Tribble & Stephens Co. v. RGM Constructors, L.P.,355 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston addressed whether a DTPA
claim based upon a subcontract could be brought if plaintiff's counsel
reviewed and approved a form of that subcontract. Section 17.49(f) of
the DTPA exempts claims based upon a written contract if, in negotiating, the plaintiff is represented by legal counsel who is not directly or
indirectly identified, suggested, or selected by the defendant or its
agent. 356 Based upon this exemption, RGM moved for and was granted
summary judgment at the trial court. At trial, Tribble's attorney stipulated on the record that Tribble's previous counsel reviewed and approved the form contracts that were to be used for the project, including
357
the form contract that was used to memorialize the RGM agreement.
However, the court of appeals found that, during the contract negotiations with RGM, Tribble's project manager asserted that he was not represented by counsel, and both parties stipulated that the form contract
was amended before execution. 358 Based upon these facts, the court of
appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the DTPA requires that
counsel review something more than form contracts in order for section
17.49 to apply; otherwise, the term "negotiate" would have little or no
354. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007(a) (Vernon 2004); In re Fitzmaurice, 141

S.W.3d 802, 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding).
355. 154 S.W.3d 639, 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
356. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.49(f) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

357. Tribble & Stephens Co., 154 S.W.2d at 660.
358. Id.
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meaning. The court of appeals thus recognized that while most form contracts are reviewed and approved by attorneys in the abstract, such review does not extend to negotiations and contracts executed based upon
359
the reviewed forms.
In Matheus v. Sasser,360 a homebuyer brought a DTPA action against a
real estate agent for misrepresenting the amount of square feet contained
in the home that he purchased. Matheus made an offer of $359,000 for
what he believed was a 4,218 square foot home. The seller counter-offered and ultimately accepted Matheus's offer of $343,225.361 An appraisal performed at the request of the mortgage company revealed that
the house only contained 3,593 square feet; Matheus did not receive the
appraisal until after the sale closing. 362 Despite being substantially
smaller than originally thought, however, the house appraised for
$347,000, nearly $4,000 more than the purchase price. 363 Thus, the Fort

Worth Court of Appeals wrestled with what constituted the appropriate
measure of damages, if any, in this case.
Past courts have held that if there are shortages in a home's actual
square footage, then the proper measure of damages is the difference between the advertised and actual square footage multiplied by the price
paid per square foot. 364 Yet, in this case, there was no evidence that
Matheus calculated his offer based upon a price per square foot. 365 Furthermore, Matheus provided no evidence that the home was devalued as
a result of the square-footage deficiency. 36 6 Indeed, the home actually

had a higher fair market value at 3,593 square feet than Matheus had paid
(while believing that he was purchasing a 4,218 square foot home). 367 As
a result, the appellate court found that Matheus received property greater
than the value he bargained for, even though it contained fewer square
feet than originally thought. 368 The appellate court held that to give
Matheus the difference between the square footage multiplied by the
price paid per square foot would overcompensate him. The only remaining identifiable lost value was intrinsic value, which is not compensable
36 9
under the DTPA.
F.

PREMISES LIAMLITY

The issue presented in Sanmina-Sci Corp. v Ogburn370 was whether the
359. Id.
360. 164 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.).

361. Id. at 457.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 461.
364. Id. at 460 (citing George D. Thomas Builder Inc. v. Timmons, 658 S.W.2d 194, 197
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
365. Id. at 460-61.
366. Id. at 461.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.

370. 153 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
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actual knowledge of a general "unreasonably dangerous condition" imputed constructive knowledge of a specific, related condition that actually
caused harm. Ogburn was employed as a truck driver for a freight company and made frequent deliveries to a facility operated by Sanmina.
Over the course of several weeks, a warehouse door at the facility was
propped open with a pole or piece of wood to keep it from closing.
Ogburn personally informed the facility supervisor of the hazardous condition of the door. While attempting to lift the faulty door on one such
visit to the facility, a roller fell from the door and injured Ogburn. At
trial, several employees of Sanmina acknowledged that they were aware
that the door was in general need of repair; nonetheless, Sanmina contended that it did not know the specific problem with the door's rollers
and therefore, could not have foreseen a roller falling from the door causing injury. The jury found both parties partially negligent, attributed 70%
of the negligence to Sanmina, and awarded compensatory damages to
3 71
Ogburn.
On appeal, Sanmina contended that the judgment should be reversed
because no evidence was presented at trial that Sanmina had actual or
constructive knowledge that an unreasonably dangerous condition existed. The appeals court disagreed and upheld the lower court's judgment, citing long-held law that actual or constructive knowledge by a
premises occupier of any condition that poses an unreasonable risk of
harm to invitees creates a duty to take whatever action reasonably prudent under the circumstances to reduce or eliminate the unreasonable
risk from the condition. 372 Additionally, an occupier of a premises has
constructive knowledge of any dangerous condition that would be revealed by a reasonably careful inspection. 373 Furthermore, a condition
poses an unreasonable risk of harm if there is sufficient probability that a
reasonably prudent person could have foreseen a specific or similar
harmful event as a likely occurrence. 374 Foreseeability for this purpose
does not require anticipation of a specific harmful event, 37 5 but only that
the general danger of a harmful event be foreseeable. 376
The court held that because Sanmina had actual knowledge of the disrepair of the warehouse door, Sanmina had actual or constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition that was the proximate
cause of Ogburn's injuries even though Sanmina may not have foreseen
the specific event that led to the injuries. Thus, the court upheld the
lower court's ruling.377

371. Id. at 641.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. 1983).
See id.
County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. 2002).
Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex. 1970).
Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996).
Ogburn, 153 S.W.3d at 642.
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G. ENVIRONMENTAL
In Seaway Products Pipeline Co. v. Hanley,378 the Fort Worth Court of
Appeals examined an issue of first impression, clarifying the definition of
who may be responsible for solid waste under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA"). In this case, a gasoline pipeline owned and operated by Seaway Products Pipeline Company and located on land owned
ruptured while the land was being cleared
by Richard E. Bloomfield, Sr.
379
for residential construction.
Seaway claimed that Bloomfield was liable under the SWDA for Seaway's reasonable and necessary cost of removal and remediation actions
in connection with the pipeline rupture. 380 In order for Seaway to maintain a valid claim against Bloomfield under the SWDA, however, Seaway
had to present evidence that Bloomfield was a "person responsible for
solid waste." The court of appeals found that the only evidence
presented on this issue was that Bloomfield owned the land when the
381
pipeline was ruptured.
The SWDA states that a person is responsible for solid waste if the
person is an owner of a "solid waste facility. ' 382 "Solid Waste Facility"
includes all contiguous land, including structures and other improvements, used for "processing, storing, or disposing of solid waste. '383 The
appellate court noted that, beyond looking at statutory definitions, no
Texas court had "fully addressed who qualifies as a person responsible for
solid waste" under the SWDA. 384 Thus, the appellate court would have
to "determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature" by focusing
on the statute's plain language, the consequences that would follow from
various constructions of the statute, and the presumption that the legisla385
ture intended a "just and reasonable result" in enacting the statute.
The court of appeals concluded that Bloomfield was not an owner and
operator of a solid-waste facility simply by owning the land that the pipeline ran under. The appellate court noted that no evidence was presented
that showed that Bloomfield used the land for processing, storing, or disposing of solid waste. The appellate court further stated that "it is unfathomable that the legislature intended every residential landowner in
to be
Texas who has a pipeline easement running underneath its property
386
considered an owner and operator of a solid waste facility."

378.
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380.
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382.
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153 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
Id. at. 647.
Id. at 648.
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TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 631.271 (Vernon 2001).
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